MARK EUGENIKOS
FIRST ANTIRRHETIC AGAINST
MANUEL CALECAS
ON
ESSENCE AND ENERGY

PROTHEORIA

The moving cause of this treatise, as well as its final cause, which is its purpose, will be stated at the beginning. However, we will now speak of its specific and exemplary nature: that since the opponent, concerning the matters in which he seems to agree with the heresy, has made his case using quotations and boasts exceedingly in this, while also uttering a few things from his own reasoning, it was necessary for us, following his example, to set against the poorly interpreted quotations from the saints those which are soundly understood. This is especially so since the fathers who came before us, who from the beginning exposed the heresy, valiantly and earnestly defended the dogma, demonstrating with what they call "geometrical necessities" how accurately and soundly it stands. Therefore, it would have been superfluous for us to elaborate further on what has already been well said by them. As for the more combative and detailed arguments, let anyone who wishes to learn about them turn to those works. Let it be known, however, that the present work is merely a collection of Scriptural and patristic quotations with some brief elaboration, even if it has been structured in a combative manner out of necessity. Moreover, it contains not a few things from our own reasoning, none of which have been said before by others on the same subject. If, however, it occasionally speaks more harshly against the one to whom the discourse is directed, it begs the reader not to judge it harshly, for it was not possible to remain entirely restrained when opposing such great obstinacy and slander. Indeed, no one who has engaged in such arguments has entirely avoided this. Furthermore, the distinguishing name of the man, which is as much a name of ill repute as it seems to partake of good, compelled us to devise other names for him, which he himself has indeed earned by daring to commit such apostasy. If anyone has also read the so-called Guidebook of the God-bearing father Anastasius of Sinai, they will know that we have used language more moderately than might have been expected.

MARK OF EUGENIKOS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIVINE ESSENCE AND ENERGY

Mark, the most blessed Archbishop of Ephesus, Eugenikos, Against the First of the Statements of Manuel Kalekas Concerning the Synodical Tome, First Refutative Discourse or On the Distinction Between Divine Essence and Energy.

This man is the last of those from that faction who have attacked the Church, and though he seemed at first to approach the matter more simply than others, as he progresses, he leaves no excess of insult and slander untouched, imitating in all things his fathers and the leaders of the heresy. For my part, if all the sons of the Church were willing to bring forth the grace given to her and to rightly detest those who insult her, and to utterly erase the blasphemies written in their works by every means, I would not have thought it necessary to engage in any discourse on this present subject, considering that the heresy has already died and that I am, moreover, particularly unskilled in speaking and lacking in theological expertise. But alas, what a calamity! What they concocted in darkness and barely revealed to two or three of their followers, to the detriment of their own souls, our people now dare to bring to light and even to boldly defend as if they were sound. Who could endure such destruction in silence and not rise up with the word of truth to refute the falsehood that is being advanced and to show it for what it truly is, even if it deceives with a veneer of plausibility those who, out of vanity or meddlesomeness—or I know not what else to call it—give it their attention?

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For they ought not to consider themselves wiser or more secure than the canons of the Spirit, nor should they disregard the civil laws, which explicitly decree that such writings be erased and given to the fire. Indeed, the canon of the Sixth Synod states verbatim: "All the childish toys and mad Bacchic revelries, the false writings composed against the holy icons, are to be handed over to the episcopal archive of Constantinople, so that they may be placed with the rest of the heretical books. If anyone is found hiding these, if he is a bishop, priest, or deacon, let him be deposed; if he is a layman or monk, let him be excommunicated."

Likewise, the civil law states: "The common writings against Christians by Porphyry and others are to be burned, as well as any writings that do not agree with the faith of the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus and with Cyril of Alexandria, from whose faith it is not

permitted to deviate. Those who possess and read the aforementioned books are severely punished.”

And another law states: "Those who possess the writings of Severus and do not burn them are to be punished by having their hands cut off.” And before these, the great Emperor Constantine, in his law against Arius, says: "If anyone is found hiding a writing composed by Arius and does not immediately bring it forth and consume it with fire, the penalty for this shall be death; for immediately upon being caught, he shall suffer the punishment of losing his head.”

These are the laws we ought to observe concerning these new heretics, who have striven so greatly to surpass their predecessors in their insults against us, and who have almost outdone all others in impiety. But alas, their meddlesomeness and their constant craving for novelty, as Paul says, "itching to hear something new," leads them to run after opposing doctrines, and those who are careless are pierced through with a spear. Through their "smooth talk"—for it seems there was no other way for them to perish—they drink down the whole poison. But enough of this; let us now proceed to the refutation, since we have been compelled to take up the discourse against the all-powerful divine energy blasphemed by them.

Their Claim and Our Response: They claim here, he says, to elaborate more clearly on the decision of the Synod concerning the question of the divine essence and divine energy, so that those who are ignorant out of simplicity may learn, for as the divine Apostle says, "The one who is ignorant will be ignored," and so that those who slander and accuse others rashly, or rather irrationally and foolishly, may be refuted as wrongdoers.

Now, his discourse is directed against the Synodical Tome composed during the reign of Kantakouzenos, against Gregory and his faction. Gregory himself, in his response, was refuted by both the holy Gregory of Thessalonica and the illustrious Patriarch Philotheos, each in lengthy discourses. Not only did Gregory shamefully cut out most of the strongest arguments presented there, attacking only a few points that seemed easy to refute, but he also, in his excessive madness, distorted even these and, as if sprouting from the words of the saints, attacked the Synod. For almost the entire Tome is woven together in this way: just as dogs bite the stones thrown at them, so too does he blaspheme the words of the saints as if they were ours. It seems that this present dogmatist and enemy has encountered these words and, like a dog, bites them. For he strives to attack opposing arguments, not to gain anything from them, but to distort and malign them, as will be shown. He takes a different path and promises to elaborate more clearly on the decision of the Synod, "so that," he says, "he may refute those who slander and accuse unjustly.”

But it is remarkable to observe the power of truth: for he did not dare to promise a refutation, any more than those with eye diseases dare to look at the sun. Instead, he pretends that he was unable to find the entire Tome, but received only some parts from one of his companions. And so he comes to us as if to explain, not to refute. But even if he had "stolen the hearing," as they say, he arranges the matter in such a way as not to immediately turn away the readers. Nor would this be far from their usual deceitfulness. What he sets forth here as an apostolic saying, I do not know where he got it from, unless he himself fabricated his own Scriptures. For he risks being ignored as one who is ignorant, as he himself says, though I do not know by whom.

Dividing everything he has composed into two parts, he first consumes himself with what he calls the clarity of the Tome, and then, gathering together the quotations that seem to agree with his views, he inserts them and distorts some of the things in the Tome, interpreting them according to his own opinion, as Gregory did. Yet, if he could genuinely and lawfully refute, as he often claims, why did he not confront the arguments presented there? Why did he need clarity and exposition, and the writings of Palamas? But let us follow step by step this cowardly and cunning beast, and wherever he distorts and corrupts, let us strike him with the weapons of Scripture; and wherever he strays, let us surpass him.

The Synodical Decision: He claims that the entire Synod, having made and written this decision—for it is necessary to be concise—set it up as a pillar of Orthodoxy for itself. Indeed, he asserts that the Tome of Palamas was designated to be called this.

Where and when was this decided, my good man? How could the entire Synod, as you yourself say, with a pious emperor presiding, entrust the common opinion solely to Palamas? Do you see how little you care about being caught in a lie, since you so openly speak falsehoods without concealment? Such are your subsequent claims as well.

Historical Context: Let this also be known to the minds of those who will read the present work: there was a time when this Church previously issued another decision contrary to this one. The synodical acts that preceded this, during the reign of Andronikos, and the historical accounts concerning these matters bear witness to this.

Who would still be surprised if these corrupters of divine doctrines misinterpret theological expressions, which is common to all heretics, especially when they so shamelessly reject and distort even the events of yesterday and the day before, which are proclaimed in writing and attested by many who still survive? How could they be trusted when speaking about divine matters, they so blatantly lie about our affairs and refuse to allow even those who think and speak contrary to them to bear witness? For who does not know that the Church, in three great Synods—the first while the renowned Emperor Andronikos was still alive and present, the second after his departure from this life, and the third and final one during the reign of Kantakouzenos—consistently expressed the same opinion concerning the divine energy and grace, as being distinct in some way from the divine essence? Or did not Barlaam, Akindynos, and Gregory all dogmatize the same things? Of these, the first was condemned by the earlier Synod, Akindynos by the one following it, and the last by the final Synod, as was fitting.

But the one who hoped to be shielded by falsehood not only places this at the beginning of his composition but also repeats it at the end, saying that one ought not to trust the Church when it expresses the opposite opinion concerning the same matters. Yet, even if this were true concerning the Fifth and Sixth Ecumenical Synods, where the heresies of the Monothelites and the Iconoclasts were raised and confirmed, and then overturned and abolished, why should we on this account crown those divine Synods with wool and dismiss them, because a contrary vote had previously been cast in the same Church? Or do we not consider the Church to be always one and the same, not in its persons but in the character of its orthodox mind, according to which all the Churches throughout the world are called "One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church"? And shall we not regard those who at various times have burst in upon her as destroyers, not as the fullness of the Church, nor as shepherds and teachers, but as "savage wolves," according to the apostolic prophecy, who spare not the

flock? Such, then, was the patriarch who was exposed in these Synods, for having changed his mind to the opposite and attempting to rebuild what he had destroyed—the doctrines of the Barlaamites. By this, he did not rebuild those doctrines but rather established himself as a transgressor.

And perhaps the writings of that man and the cold assistance he provided to Akindynos and those of like mind, aided by the confusion of political affairs, are what this false speaker calls a "contrary decision." But these writings have nothing to do with the Church, any more than the writings of John Bekkos concerning the innovation of the Latins, or anyone else who innovated before him. Rather, the one who composed them later brought upon himself a just condemnation. For the synodical votes, through the sacred tomes set forth at that time, are clearly established.

The Accusation Against Barlaam: ”For when Barlaam heard our monks saying that, according to the tradition of the holy fathers, those who have purified their hearts through the commandments of God mystically and ineffably receive divine illuminations, he accused them of saying that the essence of God is participable. But when they defended themselves, saying that it was not the essence but the uncreated, eternal, and deifying grace of the Spirit, he attempted to bring a charge against them for introducing a second divinity. And again, declaring that by a common synodical vote, since Barlaam had wrongly and dangerously applied himself to divine matters, he was condemned, and he supposedly sought forgiveness for these things. And indeed, he declared that if he truly showed repentance and was no longer found speaking or writing about such matters, it would be well; but if not, he would be anathematized and cut off from the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ and from the orthodox body of Christians. Moreover, if anyone else should be found speaking or writing anything blasphemous and ill-advised against the monks—or rather against the Church itself—uttered or written by him, accusing the monks or even touching on such matters, he too would be subjected to the same condemnation by our moderation and would be anathematized and cut off from the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ and from the orthodox body of Christians."

And the renowned Emperor Andronikos Palaiologos, in the same Tome concerning the most divine light of the Transfiguration, says: "Even if the initiates of the Lord ascended to such a height of contemplation on Tabor and saw divine grace and glory, they did not see the very nature that bestows grace. For we know from the divine Scriptures that it is imparticipable, incomprehensible, invisible, even to the supercelestial and highest powers.”

The Opposition to Later Dogmas: Are these statements opposed to what was later dogmatized, or do they say the same things about the same matters? But let us proceed further, for our aim from the beginning to the end is not, as this man claims, to "elaborate more clearly on the decisions of the Synod," but to set forth his own ramblings naked, so that the shame in them may be more clearly seen. For after enumerating the chapters presented to the Synod, he adds: "It is clear from the decision in the Tome that they do not propose that distinction by which the one God is ineffably distinguished in His hypostases, but some other distinction invented by them, by which, as they wish, the Trihypostatic God is distinguished into essence and energy, or rather essence and energies.”

The Divine Distinction According to the Fathers: But what about the one who strives to unite and distinguish divine things by reason, as the divine things themselves are united and distinguished? I mean Dionysius the Areopagite, who, following us, handed down such a distinction. For he says in the first chapter of On the Divine Names, which bears the title On the United and Distinguished Theology, after presenting the distinction according to the divine hypostases: "These unions and distinctions according to the ineffable union and existence are unions and distinctions. And if there is also a divine distinction, it is the good-like procession of the union, which, being super-united in itself, multiplies and increases itself by goodness. The impartible communications, the essential, life-giving, wisdom-bestowing, and other gifts of the goodness of the Cause of all are united according to the divine distinction, by which the imparticipably participated things are hymned from the participations and the participants." And the divine Maximus, interpreting the same saying in his Scholia, says: "He now theologizes concerning the ineffable Trinity up to the three hypostases. But there is also another kind of divine distinction, the procession of God into the manifold creation of the invisible and visible through the abundance of goodness. And the creative providences and goodnesses are common to the Trihypostatic distinguished Monad." And again: "God is said to multiply Himself by the providential processions of His will for the production of beings, but He remains indivisibly one, just as the sun sends forth many rays but remains in unity." And again: "He calls the divine energy here a procession, which produced every substance." And the great Dionysius again in the same chapter: "We say that the divine distinction is, as has been said, the good-like processions of the Thearchy. For bestowing on all beings and overflowing the participations of all good things, it is unitedly distinguished, and it is multiplied singularly and manifoldly from the One without departing." And again: "We shall attempt to hymn these common and united distinctions of the whole Godhead from the theonyms that reveal them in the Scriptures, as far as we are able."

Theological Clarification: Do not these theologians seem to you to distinguish the one God into His energies, not using the distinction invented by us, but moving their hand as if from the treasure-house of the Spirit? Or do they also seem to be polytheists, saying that God is multiplied and increased? For these things, our precise advocate of monarchy in what follows calls "nonsense." But listen to how the Church glorifies these things; perhaps you might understand something—though you yourself, having sunk into the deepest folly, would no longer understand, but what is said might be a healing for those struck by you.

We, O empty theologian and superstitious monotheist, do not cut short our one God according to the Jewish contraction and lowliness, as if He were devoid of the Son and the Spirit, who are of the same nature and of the same mind, nor do we, according to Greek vanity and mythology, honor a multitude of subordinate gods attending to their own affairs, as if they were some satraps. What then? Do we, wishing to guard it in simplicity, consider it to be what it is—energy? For having assumed this, the wretched one, no less than the demonic Aristotle, dogmatized that the world is coeternal with God and that all things here are devoid of His providence, consistently. For it is not likely that energy, being energy, does not energize from eternity, nor that it reaches things here, which are subject to change, needing some varied administration and economy.

But not so do we, not so has our theology taught us to think. For we understand God as an active essence, willing, and omnipotent, from His own nature, timelessly and eternally subsisting as Son and Spirit, and from His will and energy, the sensible and intelligible

creation. And this John of Damascus clearly theologizes, saying:
"The work of the divine nature is the pre-eternal and eternal generation; the work of the divine will is creation."

Thus, both the fitting reverence for God is preserved, and what is due to creation is given, neither dragging down the Son and the Spirit into creation nor elevating creation to divine dignity.

Justin Martyr's Philosophical Argument: These things are also philosophized by Justin, the philosopher and martyr, who most of all opposed the Aristotelian doctrines. For in the third of his Questions to the Greeks, when the Greeks said that in God, to be and to will are not different, for what He is, He wills, and what He wills, He is, and there is no division in God because He is self-moved, the blessed one refutes them, saying: "Since God has essence for existence and will for making, the one who rejects the difference between essence and will also rejects the existence of God and the making of things that are not, the existence of God and the making of things that are not." And again: "If to exist is one thing and to inhere is another—and the essence of God exists, while the will inheres in the essence—then the essence of God is one thing, and the will is another." And again: "To will is either essence or belongs to essence. But if it is essence, the one who wills does not exist; if it belongs to essence, then necessarily one is one thing, and the other is another. For being and belonging are not the same." And again: "If God wills many things, and many things are not, then in God, to be and to will are not the same."

The Distinction in the Tome: This one, having overlooked these things laid down in the Tome and many other clear testimonies, accuses those who set forth the Tome of introducing the distinction from themselves. And adding some things in between, he concludes by saying: "From these things, it is clear that the energy, which they say is distinguished from the essence, they also confess to be divinity and uncreated. Therefore, their discourse concerns two and many divinities, differing among themselves. And this is shown more clearly from the words of Palamas, the leader of this decision and opinion, who in almost all his works constructs this, no less than in the discourse whose beginning is: 'Following the spiritually moved votes of the fathers.' For Barlaam and Akindynos, ridiculing these things, cry out against those who cherish the confession to the saints as if they were somehow saying two uncreated divinities, a higher and a lower, not seeing that this so-called charge is referred to our holy fathers."

The Name "Theotes" (Divinity): "That 'Theotes' (Divinity) is a name of energy rather than of the divine essence, as even 'Theotes' itself is sometimes called, so that from this alone their difference is evident, is not our argument, nor is it concluded by the Synod, but it is unquestionably and clearly from the holy fathers. For the divine Gregory of Nyssa, in his discourse On the Divinity of the Son and the Spirit, says: "They say"—clearly the Arians —"'Theotes' is significative of nature. But we say that the divine nature either has no significative name or does not have one for us. But if anything is said, whether from human custom or from divine Scripture, it is something signified about it. But the divine nature itself remains ineffable and unutterable, transcending all signification through speech."

And after some things: "Therefore, the name 'Theotes' does not present nature but the power of contemplation." And in To Ablabius: "'Theos' (God) signifies one who energizes,

but 'Theotes' (Divinity) signifies energy. But none of the three is energy, but rather each of them is energizing.” And again in the letter To Eustathius: "Therefore, the identity of energy in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit clearly shows the unvarying nature. So that even if the name 'Theotes' signifies nature, it is properly applied to the Holy Spirit as well, since the commonality of essence composes this, but I do not know how they bring the name 'Theotes' to the indication of nature, those who construct everything.” And after some things: "Therefore, the name brings the indication of some authority, whether contemplative or energizing.” And again in To Eunomius: "And the name 'Theotes' itself, whether it signifies the contemplative or providential authority, was fitting for the human.”

And the great Dionysius says: "Divinity is the providence that contemplates all things."

That providence is energy is attested by the great Athanasius, who writes: "The Father and the Son do not work according to one providence and another, but according to one and the same essential energy of Divinity."

These things are explicitly stated by the teachers and luminaries of the Church. But if from these statements two or many divinities are inferred, does it not follow, as you yourself introduce Palamas saying, that the charge is referred to those who said it? But we, defending both ourselves and our holy fathers, say that the Church has received the tradition of confessing one Divinity, not as signifying one thing—namely, nature alone—as the name is said to signify. For you see that this does not seem to be the case according to the saints. Rather, it is because there is not one energy and another and another, nor one nature and another and another of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For in this way, many divinities would have a place, as the holy and Ecumenical Sixth Synod determines in the fifth tome of its eleventh act: "God and God and God, but one God in three. For the Father is not one God, nor is the Son another God, nor again is the Holy Spirit another God, since the Father is not one nature, nor is the Son another nature, nor again is the Holy Spirit another nature. For this would devise many and different gods and produce many and different divinities. But God is the Father, God is the Son, and God is likewise the Holy Spirit, as the three persons indivisibly and without lack fill one Divinity."

And the great Basil, again in his letter To Eustathius, says: "Whether 'Divinity' is a name of energy, as we say that there is one energy of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so we say that there is one Divinity; or whether, according to the opinions of many, the name 'Divinity' is indicative of nature because no variation is found in nature, we rightly define the Holy Trinity as one Divinity."

And Gregory of Nyssa, again in To Ablabius, says: "Insofar as the energy mentioned in the three is one and unvarying, so also is the Divinity one, and one God in three hypostases."

Do you hear how the saints understood it fitting to confess one Divinity and one God? But what do you say, what do you dogmatize, O novel examiner of divine names? Since, he says, the essence of God is one only, called Divinity, for this reason we say that we confess one Divinity. That you are in agreement with Eunomius and the Arians in this, others have said, and it is clear from the statements of the saints. But, "O scoundrel," according to your definition, it would have been necessary not to believe in one Divinity but to say "one the Divinity" and never to utter this without the article, so that when it is said of different persons, yet being one, the Divinity of the three persons would not be thought of as one, just as we say one power of the three, just as indeed Divinity. But nothing prevents the creative, providential, and wonderworking powers from being understood by those who speak of them. These certainly differ from one another, "even if you burst" trying to draw them into one and

identify them. But if many powers are said to be in God—for according to the great Dionysius, "God is power, as containing all power in Himself"—yet many divinities are in no way admitted, and this is according to us and the truth. For Divinity is sometimes spoken of concerning nature, and for this reason, gods must be introduced with divinities. But power is never spoken of concerning nature, just as energy is not.

For "nature and energy," according to the divine Cyril, are not the same. Therefore, powers and energies are expressed and understood in the plural, and God is said to be multiplied and increased according to them, as you have heard. But again, you cry out, lamenting over the one Divinity, fearing lest, by calling the energy Divinity, you fall into many divinities. But even "humanity," O fool, might be said to be the nature itself by which we are human, and it might also be said to be something proper to nature, such as the rational power, by which man is especially distinguished from other animals, and the "laughing and upright-walking" power, and anything of this sort, but most properly the power of nourishing, from which it is also named, as the divine Anastasius of Sinai says in the so-called Guide, and already Solomon, and in doing justice and being refined, humanity is defined. For "fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man," and further, the system of many men is called humanity, but for this reason, many humanities are not said to exist or to be spoken of. For one humanity is in us, considered according to all these things. But if where many individual men exist, there is one humanity, because the natural things are not separate from the nature in which they are considered, how, where God is one and the three are one, would many divinities have a place?

But why do you accuse and bring forward Palamas, because he altogether accepted and brought forward this expression in his writings? Especially since "our discourse is not about words," as he himself says in defense in the Tome, "but about things and right opinion." For as you say these things and infer them, he, assuming them to be yours, said that, these things being so, it was necessary to accuse the saints, if it was necessary. Otherwise, one might accuse David and charge him with atheism, because he dared to utter and deliver to writing what is meditated in the heart of the fool: "There is no God." If, therefore, you accuse the expressions, you would justly accuse yourself, the first to utter the blasphemy. But if you accuse the things and the meaning, he has defended himself at length and in detail concerning this, the truly theological tongue and rational and philosophical, and those things are set forth for those who wish to see clear proofs of the man's sound and precise mind in all things. It has also been said by us here moderately that "now there are not two and many divinities, nor is number at all introduced from our opinion," it has been clarified. But what he added from the Dialogue Against Barlaam and the Orthodox, as: "The other divinities spoken of by the saints, whether one or two or more," is not found written thus, but thus: "If any other of the energies is called Divinity by the saints, whether one or two or more."

But having firmly assumed, as has been said, that we introduce two and many divinities, he proceeds from this to a greater and more absurd charge, as he thinks and says: "That these things distinguished in God, whether these divinities, are not only distinguished in reason but are also realities, and not simply names, and this they construct through many things."

And next, he sets forth the things from which they construct this. Now, the expression of many divinities we do not accept at all, for neither have our fathers said it. But the divine powers and energies, and simply anything that belongs to God naturally and essentially, unless we proclaim them as realities explicitly, we would be ashamed. For if in us virtue is a reality, and wisdom is a reality, and again knowledge is a reality, how in God would these be

supposed to be bare and empty names only, when what belongs to Him naturally and from eternity so far surpasses what is acquired in us as being surpasses non-being? But let the theologians again come forward to confirm the opinion for us through their own words. And the great Athanasius, in his discourse On the Synod of Nicaea, interpreting the words "All that the Father has is mine," says thus: "The Savior did not say this on account of created things, but on account of what pertains to the Divinity of His Father, which the Lord called His own, such as immortality, incorruptibility, unchangeableness, incomprehensibility, power, foreknowledge."

And Gregory of Nyssa, in the first discourse of the Antirrhetics, says:
"For there is not one thing in reasoning about the things said piously concerning God that you will encounter another reality or thought that will be able to surpass the antiquity of what has been said.” And the divine confessor Maximus, in his discourse To Pyrrhus, calling the union of natures an energy, since he says, "Union is a relation and not a reality; therefore, the energy of Christ is a relation and not a reality," as he obviously thinks the energy is a reality, which he also shows to be uncreated and distinct from the divine essence in the same discourse, thus says to the same Pyrrhus: "Further, you will be compelled to say that this energy is either created or uncreated, since there is no middle between created and uncreated. And if you say it is created, it will indicate a created nature only; but if uncreated, it will characterize an uncreated essence only. For the natural things must altogether be appropriate to the natures, and how is it possible for the energy of the created and originated nature to be uncreated, or for the energy of the uncreated and unoriginated nature to be created and originated and finite?"

And the same again, in the sixth chapter of the second century of the Theological Chapters, says: "There is a reality above the ages, the pure kingdom of God. For it is not lawful to say that the kingdom of God is begun or ended by ages and times."

Behold, you have heard from the saints that the natural things of God and the essential powers and energies are realities, and further, uncreated and above the ages. "But if," he says, "these energies are realities and some are called by the name of Divinity, what else is introduced but many divinities again? So that what Palamas denies in words, he establishes in realities, and only for the deception of the simpler, 'I neither thought nor think such a thing,' he says."

And he strings together such things, "babbling and fluttering." But, O excellent one, we neither say nor think many divinities, God forbid! For the energy, even if we know it to be inseparable from nature, is sometimes understood and spoken of by itself, such as goodness, wisdom, foreknowledge, or anything of this sort, for nothing prevents it. But Divinity by itself cannot be spoken of or conceived, since this name is once placed on nature. But whether one wishes to understand the contemplative, or the consuming and destroying, or the pervading power through all things, calling it Divinity, for we are led to all these conceptions by the name, as it seems to the saints, at the same time one is compelled to conceive the nature to which these belong, just as when one says humanity, if he happens to mean the contemplative power, he has at the same time conceived human nature. Therefore, it is not possible to say or conceive many divinities, lest nature also be split by the multitude. Therefore, there is one Divinity, since Divinity is nature, even if the name is applied to some of the energies.

I would say now, and with great confidence, that the Church would not at all reject this, I mean the expression of many divinities, since it does not know how to be enslaved to

syllables and words where the meaning is sound, unless it avoids Greek insatiability and the desire to give some handle to their myths. For it does not refuse to say "many spirits," according to the holy Isaiah, even though the holy hypostasis of the Spirit is one and simple. That these are the energies of the hypostasis of the Spirit, hear from the Theologian: "For the energies of the Spirit, Isaiah loves to call spirits."

That they are uncreated is clear even from this, for no one, unless utterly mad, would dare to say that creations rest upon the Master. But it is clear from what the evangelist John teaches in the Apocalypse, theologizing these things as being before the throne of God. And the divine Cyril, interpreting the very saying of Isaiah, says that the Holy Spirit itself is what rested upon Christ in His own energies: "For," he says, "although Christ became like us, He was without sin, and the Holy Spirit rested upon the human nature, as in Him first and as in the firstfruits of the race, so that it might also rest upon us and remain henceforth dwelling in the minds of the believers."

For thus the divine John says that the Spirit was seen descending from heaven and remaining upon Christ.

And John Chrysostom, in his discourse On the Holy Spirit, says: "'The Spirit of God will rest upon Him,' here the name of the nature of the Spirit. Henceforth the gifts: the spirit of wisdom and understanding," and so on. And David asks that a clean heart be created in him, but that a right spirit be renewed within him, and that he be strengthened by a leading spirit, that is, by a grace leading the passions and ruling the pleasures.

These things have been said by us concerning the divine authority of the Holy Spirit and the difference according to the energies. But the heretics, not knowing that when it says "Spirit of holiness" or "of promise," it speaks of the gifts, they refer it to nature, saying that God gave and granted the Holy Spirit. "You see," he says, "that it is a gift of God?" They read the things about the gifts and referred them to nature, when they ought to understand which names signify nature and which names interpret grace.

These things, even if they have been said by us somewhat digressively, are nevertheless not useless against those who separate these spirits—that is, the spiritual gifts—so far from the Spirit as to think—alas, the madness!—that they are created things. And these things, while Scripture calls them "the eyes of the Lord," looking upon all the earth, our God-bearing father Basil calls them "the body of the Spirit." For he says in his Logical Discourses Against Eunomius: "One might say that all these and whatever other gifts of the Spirit there are constitute, as it were, a kind of body of the Spirit, and each individual gift is a finger."

Thus, the gifts of the Spirit are united in essence with the Spirit Himself. But these men do not even understand this, and so they fall into contradictions with themselves and oppose the Latins, to whom they have defected. For indeed, the Spirit given through the breath after the resurrection would no longer be the hypostasis of the Spirit but some created thing—for it was a gift of the forgiveness of sins. And the Spirit in Paul, in which he spoke mysteries, would be a created thing. And Christ Himself, speaking in him, would be a created thing. And I marvel how they do not flee from themselves, being carried away by such impieties.

But let us return to the beginning. "Names," he says, "are the things said of God that differ only in reason."

Do you, then, fashion for us, as it seems, divine names like scarecrows and some nonexistent, airy voices? Not even respecting your own Aristotle, who said that names are symbols of the thoughts in the soul, and thoughts are symbols of realities, how could they differ from one another in reason if they are not significative of realities concerning which

they are spoken? For this surpasses all irrationality. For words are words of realities, not of bare sounds and utterances. But see also the great Gregory of Nyssa again opposing your doctrines: "Lordship," he says in Against Eunomius, "is not a name of essence but of authority, and the name of Christ indicates His kingdom, but the account of His kingdom is one thing, and the account of His nature is another."

That the kingdom is a reality and above the ages, you have heard from the venerable Maximus saying, and the same again in the same work: "And the names, whose signification is indicative of some position and existence, have their indication not of the divine nature itself but of the things piously contemplated around it."

And the great Basil, in the first discourse of the Antirrhetics, says: "How is it not ridiculous to say that the creative power is essence, the providential power again essence, the foreknowing power likewise, and in short, to posit every energy as essence? And if all these tend to one signification, it is altogether necessary that the names be able to signify the same thing as one another, as in the case of polyonyms, when we call the same person Simon, Peter, and Cephas. Therefore, the one who hears 'the unchangeable' of God will be led to 'the unbegotten,' and the one who hears 'the indivisible' will be carried to 'the creative.' And what could be more absurd than this confusion, taking away the proper signification of each of the names and legislating contrary to both common usage and the teaching of the Spirit?"

Do you hear how the names are not all placed on the essence as having the same power, as in the case of polyonyms, nor are they nonexistent and insignificant? But each of them has its own underlying signification. And if signification, then clearly also reality. For to suppose a signification without a reality is impossible, just as it is impossible to have a word without a thought. But you are not ashamed even of the common name of energy, spoken of so many and different things. For things that have a common name are realities, not merely names, unless you say that the name of names is a name, following your own assumptions.

What, then, does the marvelous treatise On the Divine Names of the truly marvelous Dionysius seem to you to have as its purpose—concerning some nonexistent things or things spoken of as one and the same? You would hardly persuade anyone, I think, who has closely followed the thought of the book. But we will hear this opinion of yours being clearly expressed by yourself in what follows, and with God's help, we will thoroughly refute it. But now we must proceed forward, passing over many of the intervening ramblings and the scattered mockery and insults. For to attempt to go through everything one by one, as one who tries to refute, is nothing short of laborious and tedious, like cleaning the dung of Augeas.

The Distinction Between Essence and Energy : "Not simply," he says, "did those of the Synod thus distinguish the essence of God and the energy from one another and say that they differ, but they also used many modes of distinction and opposition concerning them, by which it is in no way possible for the essence and the energy to come together into one and be one Divinity, as these men deceive the simpler."

But neither did we, the accused, introduce the modes of distinction from ourselves, unless we were deaf to the voices of the saints, who say that the essence and energy are one in reality, and the distinction is no hindrance. For where there are perfect hypostases, existing and contemplated in themselves—of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—the distinction does not harm the unity, for there is one Divinity in the three, and the three are one in whom

the Divinity is. Where the energy does not subsist by itself but is said to inhere and be contemplated in the essence, how will it not be one with it and precisely one?

For the distinction is conceptual, according to the great Anastasius, but the union is real and inseparable. For the energy is about the whole, and the essence is inseparable from it. And according to the same again: "Wherever the energy appears, the essence from which it proceeds is also contemplated with it. For each is uncircumscribed, and therefore they are altogether inseparable."

Behold, from this saint you have heard both things—that which is said of two, and that they are altogether inseparable, and further, that they are one in reality. These things we also think and proclaim. But how, he says, do you now say that the things you recently called realities, contemplated by themselves, are divisible in conception but indivisible in reality? Because, O friend, it is not the same thing to be realities and to be divided in reality. For in the case of substances, the soul and the body are realities—for each is a substance—but they are not divided in reality as long as they are united. And the two natures united in Christ are thus united in reality into one precise reality and one hypostasis, so that they are no longer divided except in conception. But we will not on this account deny that they are realities. For they remain thus unconfused, each with its own properties.

If, therefore, it is so with substances, and with substances so different and opposed to such an extent, how much more so when the discourse is about essence and energy, whose union is more real and altogether inseparable? For there, indeed, there is composition, but here there is none at all. For compositions belong to things existing in hypostasis, not to things contemplated in another, as the divine Maximus says. Nothing, therefore, prevents the energies from being realities and united in reality.

But proceeding next to expound the modes of distinction, the one who proposed to "elaborate more clearly on the decision of the Synod," as he boasted at the beginning, alas, how much idle talk, how much mockery and irony, how much falsehood and malice he has vomited forth! For while the divine Synod used language very simply and without superfluity, and set forth only the voices of the saints concerning distinction as they are, this lover of evil runs past these, but he himself invents endlessly, or rather scatters seeds and babbles, and increases the modes of distinction to twenty-eight in number. What is he doing with this? So that, having entirely removed the energy from the essence and separated it by wide boundaries, he may now firmly convict us as advocates of two and many divinities.

Now, the theft and buffoonery in each case, being immediately evident, should be passed over, especially since the discourse avoids satiety. But where he thought it necessary to have some construction and a more detailed discourse and testimony, these things must be brought forward, so that we may see whether he theologizes and clarifies the things of the Synod or fights against God and slanders, and does everything rather than what he proposed. For expounding the twelfth mode of distinction, he says: "They dogmatize that the essence is invisible, but the energy is visible."

And next he sets forth the things concerning the divine light. O sophist of wickedness! How did you manage to say "visible" concerning what is in the Spirit? For we do not dogmatize that the energy, or the divine light, is simply visible or intelligible, but that it is visible and intelligible to those who have become spiritual, who see and understand. And let the holy Dionysius come forward again to bear witness with us: "For when," he says, "we become incorruptible and immortal and attain the Christ-like and most blessed state, 'we shall always be with the Lord,' according to the oracle, being filled with the most luminous

contemplations of His visible theophany, which shines around us with the brightest radiance, as also the disciples in that most divine Transfiguration, and partaking of His intelligible light-giving in a passionless and immaterial mind."

Have you heard of a visible theophany? But in most holy contemplations. Have you heard of an intelligible light-giving? But in a passionless and immaterial mind. But for the mind to become such without the Spirit is impossible. For the most divine Maximus, in his contemplation On the Transfiguration, explaining the manner of that vision, says: "From the flesh, the apostles passed over to the Spirit before laying aside the life according to the flesh, by the exchange of the activities according to the senses, which the Spirit worked in them, removing the hindrances of the passions from the intellectual power in them, through which, having been purified, the senses of soul and body are trained in the spiritual words of the mysteries shown to them, being taught mystically that the most blessed radiance shining forth from His face like rays, surpassing all activity of eyes, is a symbol of His Divinity, which is beyond mind, sense, essence, and knowledge."

And John of Damascus, in his discourse On the Transfiguration, says: "Christ is transfigured, not taking on what He was not, nor changing into what He was not, but revealing to His own disciples what He was, opening their eyes and making the blind see. And this is 'He was transfigured before them.'"

And again in the same discourse: "'No one has ever seen God,' as He is by nature. But whoever has seen Him has seen Him in the Spirit. 'This is the change of the right hand of the Most High.' These are the things 'which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man.' Ever thus in the age to come, 'we shall always be with the Lord,' seeing Christ shining with the light of Divinity."

And the divine Andrew of Crete, in his discourse for the same feast, says: "The ray of that immaculate flesh, which the disciples could not bear, or from the Divinity of the Word, who was united to the flesh in hypostasis, shone forth through it beyond nature, 'they fell on their faces,' O the wonder! In an ecstasy most perfect of nature, they fell, overcome by heavy sleep and fear. Closing their senses, they utterly detached themselves from all intellectual movement and apprehension. Thus, in that divine and most luminous and invisible darkness, they were united with God, having received the vision of truly seeing by not seeing at all."

That, therefore, the evangelists saw, you have heard, and how they saw, you hear from the theologians, as far as it is possible to say. For it is not possible to speak precisely. And that what they saw was a ray of Divinity springing from that immaculate flesh, and that this ray is natural and unoriginate, or rather uncreated and coeternal with God, hear again John of Damascus saying the same thing in the aforementioned discourse: "Before the disciples, He who is always glorified in the same way and shines with the lightning of Divinity is transfigured. For having been begotten from the Father without beginning, He possesses the natural ray of Divinity without beginning, and the glory of Divinity becomes the glory of the body."

Therefore, we posit this divine energy, which shone around the disciples with luminous radiance, as not visible by nature—for otherwise it would have been seen also by the rest of the people, who were, as is likely, around the mountain—but as visible invisibly and understood unknowably by divine grace and the power of the Spirit. And according to this, we say that God Himself becomes visible in some way by condescension and grace, He who is invisible by essence. But whether this agrees with the saints or not, let us see again. For the great Basil, in Against Eunomius on the Trinity, says: "If the Son were true light, the light that

enlightens every man coming into the world, but God, he says, 'dwells in unapproachable light.' For the unapproachable is altogether true, and the true is unapproachable, since even the apostles fell at the glory of the light of the Son, being unable to gaze at it because it is unapproachable light."

And John Chrysostom, the theologian, speaking in his discourses on Uzziah concerning the Seraphim, says: "Why, tell me, do they cover their faces and spread their wings? Is it because they cannot bear the lightning and those radiances shining from the throne? And yet they did not see the light itself in its purity, nor the essence itself, but what was seen was a condescension. What is condescension? When God does not appear as He is, but as the one who is able to see Him is able, thus He shows Himself, measuring the demonstration to the weakness of the viewers. Therefore, even if you hear the prophet saying, 'I saw the Lord sitting on a throne,' do not suspect that he saw that essence, but the condescension itself, and this more dimly than the powers above."

And the same again, in the first of the same discourses: "The Seraphim, enjoying the ineffable glory of the Creator and beholding His unutterable beauty—I do not say that beauty itself, which is by nature, for this is incomprehensible, unseeable, unformed, and without place, to think thus about Him—but as much as they are able, as much as they are strong to be illuminated by that ray. For since they serve continually around the royal throne, they remain in continual joy, in eternal gladness, in unceasing exultation."

Do you hear that even to the first powers around God, not to mention men subject to generation and corruption, that essence is unapproachable and unseeable, but the glory and brightness are seeable, and this only by condescension and grace? How, then, will you reconcile 'no one has ever seen God' and 'the pure in heart will see God'? Perhaps you will think that the knowledge from creatures is called vision, but first, the promise is for the future, when the creatures 'will pass away,' and only to the worthy is the face-to-face vision hoped for. Second, even from creatures, it is not the knowledge of the essence, as the saints think, but the knowledge of the energy that comes to us. And this the luminary of the Church, Gregory of Nyssa, says in his interpretation of the Beatitudes: "The divine nature itself, whatever it is by essence, is above all comprehending thought. But He who is above all nature by nature is seen and comprehended in another way, and there are many modes of such comprehension. For it is possible to see conjecturally the One who made all things in wisdom through the wisdom manifested in the universe. For looking at the world in creation, we form an idea not of the essence but of the wisdom of the One who wisely made all things. And if we consider the cause of our life, that it came to create man not by necessity but by good will, again through this mode we say that we have seen God, having come to think of His goodness, not of His essence. So also with all the rest. For He who is by nature invisible becomes visible in His energies, being contemplated in some of His peculiarities. But the mind does not look only to this in the beatitude, that from some energy it is able to conjecture the Energizer.” And after a little: "What is the blessed vision? Holiness, purity, simplicity—all these luminous reflections of the divine nature.” And again in the same: "The beauty that surpasses all the supercosmic and heavenly beauties, which the truthful Word declared the pure in heart would see, is better than all hope and higher than all conjectural likeness."

And the great Basil, in the second discourse of the Antirrhetics, says: "The works are indicative of power, wisdom, and skill, but not of the essence itself, nor do they necessarily present the whole power of the Creator."

And the divine Cyril, in the Treasures, says: "Nothing of the divine properties is acquired. But from the effects, that is, the creatures, according to these energies, but not according to essence, God is seen."

Have you now, therefore, been subdued by so many voices and testimonies? Or do you still dare to grumble and, against your own head, act boldly and disbelieve the divine visions? For you seem to be entirely attached to the visible, fighting against the invisible. Now, to be ignorant and to be perplexed is not yet entirely blameworthy; for neither would someone who was blind from birth and then was perplexed about light and colors deserve just reproach, nor would someone inexperienced, who doubted about swimming in the presence of those who know. But to utterly disbelieve in this way and to continually contend with those who have learned by experience is plainly Judaic, not to say demonic. For when Stephen was recounting that marvelous vision, they heard him speaking and saw his face shining with an ineffable brightness, yet they were not only unmoved by what they heard or saw, but they also stopped their ears like an asp and rushed to murder the righteous one. Come then, let me again probe the wound of your hardness and heal your disbelief with the voices of the Fathers; for I have no leisure to invent remedies from myself, when it is possible to use those already prepared by them. Therefore, the most divine Maximus, interpreting the theological saying, states: "I take it that he speaks of a true vision of the night, that is, a certain vision of divine things, which, through much purity and perfect impassibility, appears to the eyes of the saints."

And Gregory of Nyssa, in his Funeral Oration for his brother, the great Basil, says the following about him: "Moses was illuminated by the light through the bush. We have something akin to this vision to say about him as well: that while it was night, a light appeared to him as he was praying in his house, and that light was immaterial, illuminating the dwelling by divine power." These, then, are the words of those who have seen and of those who believe in those who have seen, who would be judged more blessed, as the Lord’s word has declared. But you subject what is beyond nature and uncreated and immaterial to human inventions and divisions, insisting that it can never be grasped by the eyes, neither granting the miracle to divine grace and condescension, as you hear from the theologians, which surely occurs only through energy; for nature would not descend from itself, not being naturally inclined to do so, nor would it depend on the elevation and purification of those who see. And yet you grant the opposite power the ability to act upon human vision, transforming and altering it to such an extent that it seems to see what neither exists nor can exist at all. This is clearly demonstrated by the wonderworkers even to this day, who make this their art and have already received their name from it. Moreover, from the accounts recorded, it is evident that such things are merely an affection of the vision of the beholders and nothing more. For instance, Faustus, who was transformed by Simon the Magus in the presence of the great Peter, and the woman who was altered in appearance before the divine ascetic Macarius, both testify to this. But these men, by acting contrary to nature, dispose the vision of the beholders toward what is not. Tell me, then, do you not think that God, who is all-powerful, who gives existence to those who are and calls into being those who are not, can do something to the vision of men for the better, elevating it beyond nature, and this toward what truly is? For how can it be that what is not, O voices of God and words of teachers and reverence of the Fathers, the kingdom of Christ, which He promised to those who saw Him before the days, the glory of the Father, with which our Lord will come at His second coming, the light of the age to come, the natural and co-eternal radiance of the Son

and brightness, the divinity of the Father and the Spirit, shining forth in the only-begotten Son—how can it be that these are not?

These things, then, have perhaps been argued beyond measure on our part because of those who contend beyond measure. For I think that not only what is uncreated and entirely immaterial, but also nothing of the created and temporal, can be seen by a natural and created power of perception. For how could an angel, being an incorporeal intellect, be seen unless some spiritual power were granted to those who see? For we cannot attribute everything to the preparation and purification of the beholders, since even Daniel, though so purified, nearly died when he saw the terrifying angel, nor can we attribute it to the condescension and, as it were, the thickening and enveloping of the angels who appear; for this is what some have thought. For how could the archistrategos who spoke to Joshua the son of Nun have been seen by all who were then around him, as is likely, since he was a general? Yet no one saw that vision or heard the words. And what of the Lord's body after the resurrection, which had already been transformed into incorruption, so that it could enter through closed doors? Was it visible to a natural and sensory power? And why was it not seen by all, but only by the apostles, whom He intended to use as witnesses of the resurrection, and only to the extent, at the time, and in the place that He willed? And how did it come to pass that they disbelieved, even though they had heard so much beforehand about the resurrection and had seen so many raised from the dead, unless they perceived some alteration both in themselves and in the one they saw? For they disbelieved for joy, as you have heard. And how did they believe at all, unless they were persuaded by a great power, through which they also bore witness to the resurrection? And what does the encounter with Luke and Cleopas mean, through another form, and the holding of their eyes and their subsequent opening, and the recognition that followed, and His disappearance? For all these things bear witness to the will and power of the risen one, through which He brought about all those manifestations to those who saw. What, then, are human reasonings? What are human inventions? Feeble and precarious things, as someone has said, which will never be able to present the most divine things in speech, nor to distinguish and explain the ways and causes as they are.

"Let faith be the guide of words concerning God," said the great Basil; "faith, not demonstration; faith, which draws the soul into assent beyond logical methods; faith, which comes not by geometric necessities, but by the energies of the Spirit." And if they do not believe, as the Scriptures say, neither will they understand. But you, who are utterly blind to divine visions but sharper in hunting down words and splitting hairs—a habit always characteristic of heretics—once again pour out the venom of bitterness against Palamas, dragging out some of his sayings to mock and ridicule, in which he seems to call the Divinity "visible." But if the theologian's phrase, "a little less than vision," seems to you to mean something other than "visible," as it does to me, I do not know why you do not listen to the heaven-revealing, God-bearing Basil, who says in his Ethical Discourses, in his explanation of Psalm 45: "The beauty of the existing One, powerful concerning Christ, is His intelligible and contemplative divinity." And a little later: "Peter and the sons of Thunder were counted worthy to behold His beauty on the mountain, surpassing the brightness of the sun and the preludes of His glorious coming with their eyes." And why do you not blaspheme the inspired translator, the most eminent of the theologians, John, who says in his commentary on him: "They saw the very divinity of the Word unveiled on the mountain."

But leaving the teachers, you turn your whole zeal against the disciple; for such things you also slander the man in the 16th chapter, distorting his words and cutting them short,

after introducing the distinction between what is above and what is below from the letter to Akindynos of that blessed one, attempting to stir up the many divinities, both above and below, which they chatter about against us, although in those very words he has as his aim the constitution of the one Divinity. Let us see, then, how accurately he used the words of the blessed Dionysius, and how this destroyer mutilated them.

For Palamas says in his letter to Akindynos: "There is, therefore, a lower divinity, which is a gift of the higher." Thus says the slanderer; but that God-inspired man, having first set down the words of the holy Dionysius, when Gaius asked, "How is He beyond all and above thearchy and agatharchy?" answers: "If you understand divinity and goodness as the very matter of the divinizing and good-making gift, of the so-called divinity and goodness, as of thearchy and agatharchy, He is beyond every principle." Then he adds: "There is, therefore, a lower divinity, according to the God-wise theologians, as the great Dionysius also said here, which is deification, being a gift of the higher essence of God." Are you in agreement with the great Dionysius, or is Palamas above your cavils, or do both fall under them? You would hardly say so, you who spare not even the holy theologians. What opinion, then, do you hold about this divinity, beyond which you say God is, that is, according to essence, as the great Dionysius has said? There is no need for us to labor in bringing it forth, for you yourself will soon give birth to it, or rather miscarry and cast it away as an evil offspring, which, dashed against the rock—and you know which rock that is—will be shattered and destroyed, and will suffer the fate of the children of Babylon, perishing justly.

Very well; but having taken material from the aforementioned distinction between what is above and what is below, the vain-minded one again engages in technicalities, introducing certain sequences and positions, qualities and quantities, of which the Synod made no mention at all, and he introduces the manner of distinction, as if it were devised by them, "by necessary sequence." But I, God knows, hesitate to add what follows, and I almost grow dizzy contemplating the madness and folly of this wretched little man: on the one hand, that he stitches together such things from such materials, and on the other, that he hoped to escape the notice of those who read with understanding. But it is necessary to endure the unpleasantness, once having entered into such discourses. For it is said in the Tome: "The divine essence precedes as that which is according to will, and the divine energy follows as that which is beyond will." This they try to demonstrate from the words of the great Athanasius, who said in another sense, against the Arians: "If they ascribe to God the willing of things that are not, why do they not recognize that which is above the will of God?" And again he says: "Just as the contrary to the will is what is beyond will, so what is according to nature is above and precedes the will."

The fathers of the Synod, then, having simply stated these words to indicate the transcendence of God according to essence, went no further. But this marvelous expositor of ours, having passed over these, let us see how he unfolds the meaning, whether of those who used the words or of the one who first spoke them. Rather, he has correctly set forth the meaning of those who used them; for he adds directly, saying: "Since what is according to nature is above the will, and the divine will of God is energy, therefore what is according to nature is also above the divine energy." To this, he cannot even look; but what he adds as absurd, reasoning thus, is directly referred to the teacher, and waging war against him, the accursed one does not even perceive what he is saying. For what does he say? "But the teacher says: 'What is according to nature is above and precedes the will, just as the contrary to the will is what is beyond will,' and the absurd reasoning: 'Therefore, what is beyond will

follows what is according to nature, and in the same sequence, the divine energy follows the divine essence.'" Well done, O wise analogy and demonstration! Is this the other meaning, wretch, according to which you said the great one spoke the words? And what sequence did he ever speak of the contrary to the will following what is according to nature? For it remains to defend him, for he said that the contrary to the will is what is beyond will, and what is according to nature is above and precedes the will. What necessary sequence, then, follows from these extremes? For surely the sequence does not apply to both intervals, as if the greater follows the middle, and this follows the last. Rather, let us set forth the meaning of the saint more clearly, which this crooked one has hidden and turned to this nonsense. For the Arians, introducing a division, said that the Father begot the Son either by will or beyond will, so that if beyond will, they might ask who compelled Him, and if by will, they might prove Him to be a creature—for it was agreed that what comes from will is created. Avoiding this dilemma, the great one said: "The heretics have seen the contrary to the will, but they have not contemplated the greater and the above; for just as the contrary to the will is what is beyond will, so what is according to nature is above and precedes the will." That is, just as it is true, which they introduce by division, that the contrary to the will is what is beyond will, so it is also true, which they omit, that the essence is above the will. Therefore, a third thing having appeared, apart from the contraries of the essence, the Son would be begotten from it, neither from the will nor beyond the will, as they forced it. Thus the great one spoke the words, and thus those who used them understood them, and thus this reasoner has distorted them, doing the same thing directly. As if someone had said, "Just as the contrary to the rational is the irrational, so the intellect is above and precedes the rational," and then this one reasoned, "Therefore, the irrational follows the intellect, and in the same way, the rational follows the intellect," which is no less absurd than the irrational. For from a privative and a positive premise, a positive conclusion is not drawn, but a privative one. This is clear from what has been written. This syllogism of ours, then, is gone, having been refuted, and is nothing sound. From this, one might also infer the rest of the man’s reasoning, how full it is of absurdity and ignorance, and at the same time of folly and malice.

He says that the twentieth manner of distinction has been mythologized by them according to quantity: that the divine essence is infinitely above, and the divine energy is infinitely below. And wishing to demonstrate this, they slander the divine Maximus, who most clearly spoke such a juxtaposition concerning God and His creatures: "God is infinitely above all that participates and is participated." This they applied to the uncreated natural and essential energy of God. Again here, the fathers of the Synod having simply stated the words, this mythologist truly fashioned from them a manner of distinction according to quantity, and then brought forth his opinion concerning the use, declaring that the participated and the participating are creatures. But we will not attend to your nonsense until we hear Maximus himself, the great one, distinguishing these things and assigning some to creation, while clearly theologizing that the participated are uncreated and without beginning and are beheld essentially around God. For he says in the chapter before this, which is the 90th of the first hundred of the Theological Chapters: "The works of God that have begun in time to exist are all things that participate in being, such as the various substances of beings; for they have non-being as older than their being, for there was once a time when the participating beings were not. But the works of God that have not begun in time to exist are the participated beings, which the participating beings partake of by grace, such as goodness and everything that is contained in the concept of goodness, and simply all life and immortality and

simplicity and immutability and infinity and all that is essentially beheld around Him, which are also works of God and have not begun in time to exist; for there was never a time when goodness was not, nor any of the others mentioned, even if the participating beings have begun in time to exist according to them. For every virtue is without beginning, not having time as older than itself, having God alone as the only eternal begetter of being."

And again in the chapter after this, which is the 91st: "All immortal things and immortality itself, and all living things and life itself, and all holy things and holiness itself, and all virtuous things and virtue itself, and all good things and goodness itself, and all beings and being itself, are manifestly works of God. But some have begun in time to exist—for there was once a time when they were not—and others have not begun in time to exist; for there was never a time when virtue and goodness and immortality and holiness were not."

That the participated are all uncreated and not created, according to the participating, he himself has said, and there is no need to add. But that these very things are powers and energies of the divine nature proceeding and remaining inseparable from it, hear the divine Dionysius saying in the 11th chapter of On the Divine Names, which has the title On Peace: "We call self-being and self-life and self-divinity, primarily and divinely and causally, the one hyper-archic and hyper-essential cause of all, but participatively the providential powers given from the unparticipated God, self-substantiality, self-vitality, self-divinity, of which beings, partaking suitably to themselves, are and are called beings and living and divine."

But how, he says, can the infinitely below in God and around God be essentially beheld and be one with Him in reality? And what does this infinitely below mean at all? To this, it is not for us, but for those who first spoke it, to answer justly and to give an account, being accused of their own words; for it is not for those who have once confessed to be disciples to meddle with the words of the teachers. Nevertheless, we too will meet the accusation in the best way we can, paying a most necessary debt to the fathers by making this defense for them. We will say, then, that because they are participated and descend to the participating, and thus in a way become one with them, for this reason they are said to be infinitely below the essence of God.

"For His energies," says the great Basil in his work To Amphilochius, "descend to us, but His essence remains inaccessible." When, therefore, they are beheld in us as if created, then, looking to the participating, they are named from them, and God is said to be infinitely above all these. For how could He not be above what is altogether incomprehensible and unparticipated and invisible, compared to what is in any way comprehensible and participated and known? But how does such transcendence and descent not bring about division? For not even the ray of the sun around us, by which we are illuminated and warmed, is separated from the one sun, although it is sometimes called a sun. "For God is said to be multiplied," says the divine Maximus, "by the will for the production of beings, being multiplied by providential processions, but remaining undivided in Himself. Just as the sun, sending forth many rays, remains in unity."

And again the same one, in the 27th chapter of the first hundred of On Love, says that God is both these things and above them again, that is, according to essence, thus theologizing: "For God," he says, "being self-existence and self-goodness and self-wisdom, or rather, to speak more truly, being above all these, has nothing contrary at all."

But we have also brought forward the great Dionysius, saying the same thing: self-being and self-substantiality and self-life and self-vitality and self-divinity and self-deification. But self-being and self-life and self-divinity are beheld in God; for these, he said, are also called

the one hyper-archic cause of all, that is, the divine essence. But self-substantiality and self-vitality and self-deification are beheld in us, being created and perfected according to them, since through them we become partakers of the divine nature, as the divine Peter said. Hence they are also called powers and energies: powers, as being in God and around God from all eternity and remaining; energies, as energizing around us who are under time. But if you have also heard the one who says: "Only God is participated in, and creation only participates in being, but does not impart being," these participated things would neither be outside of God —for they are participated—nor would they be creatures. For if they were creatures, they would themselves participate in other things, and those in others, and this would go on to infinity.

But from this, he introduces another manner of distinction, calling it according to quality: "That the essence of God, as the holy beings, transcends, while the energy, as the unholy beings, is transcended." He claims that they construct this from two sayings of the great Dionysius, and this is entirely contrary to the intent of the saint. One saying is from Dionysius' response to Gaius, where he resolves the difficulty raised by Gaius, who asked his teacher, "How is He beyond all and above thearchy and agatharchy?" and demonstrates that agatharchy and thearchy refer to our relation and imitation of God. For we imitate God, not He us, which is the beginning of being deified and made good. The deified and made good, according to which they are deified and made good, and he concludes: "He who is beyond every principle is also beyond the so-called divinity and goodness, as thearchy and agatharchy, insofar as the unimitatable and unrelated transcends imitations and relations and those who imitate and participate." The other saying clarifies: "How is He called holy of holies, God of gods, Lord of lords, and King of kings?" and shows the transcendence in saying this, that insofar as the holy or divine or lordly or kingly beings transcend the unholy, so much more does the unparticipated cause transcend all beings and all participants and participations.

Having set forth the second saying in full, he distorts the manner of transcendence, claiming that they said the essence of God transcends, as the holy beings, and the energy is transcended, as the unholy beings. You, then, are babbling these things, not we, as the Synod would say, and your blasphemy turns against your own head. For you slander us no less than the teacher, just as you have done in the past by slandering the great Athanasius. For as you wrongly combined what is according to nature and beyond will from the words of the great one, so here you wrongly transferred the transcendence of the holy beings over the unholy to the divine essence and energy, not sparing even their words to blaspheme. After again bringing forward many of Palamas' words for slander, you add: "Another manner of transcendence appears: as much as creatures are below the participations in which they participate, so much are these participations below the essence of God. This is clear both from the saying and from the construction of the doctrines of their father, Palamas." But this, along with impiety, contains much folly.

Alas, the secure theologian, who just now was tearing apart Palamas' words, now condemns the great Dionysius for impiety and folly, and he determines that the impiety is clear not only from the construction but also from the saying itself. For if he is the one who spoke the analogy of transcendence, how would he not be guilty of the charges of impiety, O most impious and foolish one? And how much better it would have been to examine the saying more carefully and, with a little effort, to enter into the great one's intent, guided by

the truth itself, rather than, blinded by passion and guided by madness, to plunge yourself into the depths of impiety, thus boldly charging the theologians with impiety.

Come then, let us again, for the fathers of the Synod added nothing here, proceeding to what was urgent, examine the saying and unfold the meaning of the great one. For intending to hymn the divine essence insofar as it is simply and absolutely alone—this is clear from what has been written before, which the divine Maximus in the aforementioned chapters a little earlier places above all participated and participating things—he almost here inserts the same thing, agreeing with the words themselves, except that instead of "infinitely above," as he used there, he introduces the analogy here, saying that as much as the holy beings transcend the unholy, it is clear that they do so infinitely. For the opposites of the participants are the self-participations (it is clear that they are infinitely above; for the former are uncreated, the latter created), and to that extent the unparticipated cause transcends all these, understood as below, since they are related to one another, that is, infinitely above according to essence. Thus the theologians remain in harmony with themselves and with the truth, and the Synod again has rightly used all these. But you, wretch, leaving no distinction between the participations and the participants, since you dogmatize that both are created, say nothing else than—to also speak somewhat wildly, following your hypotheses—that as much as the self-participations transcend the participants (it is clear that it is nothing, since both are created), to that extent the unparticipated transcends both, it is clear that this is also nothing. Therefore, according to your words, God is also a creature, and thus, wishing to slander Palamas and the Synod, you have become an evil creature and have lost God, shipwrecking your faith in a little while.

These things, then, concerning the second saying, he has maliciously distorted against itself. But the first saying, since it did not serve his purpose, the patricide has cut short, placing it half-cut where he thought it would give him some handle. Therefore, let us again fill it out, we who care no less for the truth than for the honor of the fathers. For the holy Dionysius says to Gaius, who asked: "How is He beyond all and above thearchy and agatharchy? If you understand divinity and goodness, the very matter of the divinizing and good-making gift and the unimitatable imitation of the hyper-divine and hyper-good, according to which we are deified and made good—for this becomes the beginning of being deified and made good for the deified and made good—He who is beyond every principle is also beyond the so-called divinity and goodness, as thearchy and agatharchy, insofar as the unimitatable and unrelated transcends imitations and relations and those who imitate and participate."

See here the theologian, calling the divinizing gift a thing or matter, which you yourself previously forbade, and thearchy or theosis and divinity. But you, passing over these as if they were not said, attach to the imitation and the act of imitation and our relation and imitation of God the names of thearchy and divinity, very solemnly and demonstratively, since we imitate God, not He us. Therefore, O marvelous one, do you think that this thearchy is some natural suitability of ours or something acquired through effort and study, and, as it seems, not only a creature but even a creature of a creature? Alas, do you then dogmatize that divinity is such? Are you not, then, the one who introduces many divinities and so greatly differing? But hear the most divine Maximus saying: "We suffer deification as something beyond nature by grace, but we do not make deification; for we do not have by nature a receptive power for deification." And again in his theological contemplation: "If it were an ecstasy, it would not be paradoxical what happens, if deification were according to the

receptive power of nature; for it would reasonably be a work of nature. But deification will be a gift of God, and such a one will be able to be God by nature and will be properly called so; for nothing else is established than the natural power of each being, which is the unalterable movement of nature toward energy. But how deification also transports the deified out of himself, if it is contained within the limits of nature, I cannot understand."

That deification is not by nature, nor according to our suitability and effort, these things are sufficient for proof, though there are more. That it is also ungenerated and uncreated, the same one again clearly declares in his scholia on his own works, saying: "This is the gospel of God, the embassy and exhortation of God to men through the Son incarnate, and the gift of reward to those who obey Him, the ungenerated deification. By ungenerated deification, I mean the hypostatic illumination according to form, which has no generation, but is an unimagined manifestation in the worthy." And in his contemplations, the same one again: "Without father, without mother, and without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life," the great Melchizedek is recorded, as the true account of the God-bearing men has made clear concerning him, not because of his created nature and from non-being, according to which he began and ceased to be, but because of the divine and uncreated grace, which is always above every nature and time, from the ever-existing God.

And how is it not uncreated and without beginning, since it also makes those who participate in it without beginning and without end? For he says again concerning the same: "Melchizedek became without beginning and without end, no longer bearing in himself the temporal life, which has beginning and end and is troubled by many passions, but only the divine and eternal life of the indwelling Word, which is ended by no death." And again: "The word of eternal well-being comes by grace to the worthy, bringing God, who is above every beginning and end by nature, making those who have beginning and end by nature without beginning and without end by grace." But how is the same deification called both a relation and also an imitation and an image? A relation, as to the deified and made good, and to distinguish it from the unrelated essence understood in itself; an imitation, as through it we are made imitations or likenesses of God; and an image, as according to it we are formed and, so to speak, imaged.

"For true and most desirable beauty," says the great Basil in his Psalms, "which is contemplated only by the purified mind, is that which pertains to the divine and blessed nature, not that which, gazing at the sparkles and graces, partakes of something from it, as if from some dye, imparting some flowery brightness to its own appearance." Hence the unimitatable is also added to the imitation; for never will human virtue and goodness attain to that of God, even if it is ever formed according to it. But if, according to you, it is a relation and created and outside of God, to what would it be a relation, tell me? For a relation is of the related; but you have heard that God is unrelated, insofar as He is. Thus you have entirely alienated God from His creatures, appearing truly as a wretched and ungrateful creature, so that even the great Basil again rebukes you not a little in his Antirrhetics, saying thus: "Wretched in every way are the things made by God, and falling short of the glory of the Creator according to created nature, if they do not participate in divinity. Unworthy also is the account concerning God, as if He left His creation naked and desolate of Himself. But neither is creation so wretched, nor is God so powerless, as not to send forth the holy communication to creation." But how, being only from us toward God, as you define it, is the same called an unimitatable imitation? For you will not easily find a way to explain this. Such an interpreter of the holy theologians and the Synod you have shown yourself to be.

But let us proceed to what follows, having noted again that what he set forth from the dialogue between the Barlaamite and the Orthodox to slander the great Gregory is found there thus: "But the great Dionysius must also be brought forward; for he more clearly than others calls the deification of God divinity and the essence transcending it."

Another manner they have devised by looking to creation: that the divine energy is productive of things outside, while the divine essence is productive of nothing outside. But we, O best one, do not set the divine energy against the divine essence, nor do we divide them into parts, as if to banish the one from what pertains to us, as you babble, and to introduce the other. But in harmony with the theologians, we say that the divine essence does not produce the works from itself (for thus they would be consubstantial with God), but from the energy naturally and essentially united with it and entirely inseparable, or rather, we say that God through His own energy creates, sustains, and provides, just as an artisan does not create from his own essence but from the artistic power inherent in him and through it works the works of art. These things the Tome clearly and at length discusses, and the great Athanasius testifies, writing: "The Father and the Son do not work according to one and another providence, but according to one and the same essential energy of the Godhead." And the divine Cyril in the Treasures: "To make is of energy, to beget is of nature, but nature and energy are not the same." And the great Basil again: "What is made is not from the essence of the maker." And the God-bearing Damascene: "Creation, though it came to be afterward, is not from the essence of God," and again: "Creation and making are external, and what is created and made does not come to be from the essence of the creator and maker, being entirely unlike." And the divine Maximus in his scholia on St. Dionysius: "He calls the divine energy here a procession, which brought forth every substance."

To think, then, that the works are from the divine essence, besides other absurdities, also makes it changeable, which the divine Synod charged against Origen, saying: "Origen says that God, having come from not creating to creating, was altogether changed from one state to another. But we say that He was not changed according to nature, but according to energy, or rather not even according to it; for He always had the power to create and make, but this power was energized when God willed."

Very well, but why set forth what follows for refutation, since it is full of all nonsense and comedy and has nothing strong from any quarter, not even seemingly? The impiety of the writer is so evident that even one who approaches with understanding would flee from it at first glance. For from what he charges against the Synod and Palamas, he is clearly shown to be impiously and ignorantly bringing forth creatures not only from the essence of God but also, it seems, thinking the divine essence itself to be participable, in agreement with the Messalians, whom the divine Synod rebukes, saying: "There is some visitation of the Paraclete, and God dwells in the worthy, but not as the divinity has the nature. But what seems to them, the noble one, ashamed to say the same, attaches the blame to the Synod from another quarter, and taking a saying of the holy Palamas, he twists it and slanders them as saying the divine essence is corruptible. What is the saying? 'The very divine nature itself, participated in, will either suffer mixture or, having consumed the passible nature, will arrive before it is received,' and he adds, reasoning, 'But to say that it consumes this mortal nature, to what else but the corruptor should it be attributed?' And a little later: 'From these, many and no small absurdities concerning the incarnation of the God-Word are gathered. For since the blessed and ever-virgin Theotokos, having borrowed from her own all-pure and virginal blood for the God-Word flesh, and having conceived, carried, and given birth to the God-man

Word, was not consumed or corrupted, as they say, she did not conceive that very Word of God, but the hypostatic energy.' And further concerning the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of the Savior, not a few or small absurdities arise according to them.

Do you, then, think that the God-Word comes to be in us in the same way as in the blessed Virgin, and do you differ in nothing from the so-called Bogomil heretics, who call those whom they consider God-bearing, Theotokoi? But hear the most theological of the Gregories clearly teaching the difference: 'For Christ,' he says, 'because of His divinity—for this is the anointing of His humanity—sanctifies not by energy, as the other christs, but by the presence of the whole anointing one.' And the great Athanasius says: 'As the Spirit and the power of the Highest were promised to the apostles, so also to the Virgin. And if in the apostles no incarnation followed, it is clear that neither in the Virgin was the power incarnate, nor did the Spirit become man.' And a little later: 'The Virgin was filled with power and the Spirit for the sanctification of her flesh and to be able to bear the saving child. And thus, accordingly, in her, not by power and energy, but according to the whole fullness of the Godhead, the very arch-divine and hyper-archic hypostasis of the Son of God was incarnate and became man. For it was previously shown that, just as authority and kingdom and all the other things that are set forth in theology are not each called a hypostasis, but are interpreted as pertaining to the hypostasis according to essence, so also power and energy are essentially referred to the hypostasis.'

And the God-bearing Maximus in his scholia on St. Dionysius: 'The order of the holy thrones is called God-bearing, as bearing and resting intellectually upon God. But the flesh of the Lord is called God-bearing, as bearing the God-Word according to an indivisible union, being properly and truly called and existing as His flesh. But these, as has been said, have God in themselves not according to essence but according to grace, and for this reason they are also called God-bearing.' And the Golden-Mouthed in his interpretation of the Psalms: 'Having given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts, he speaks of the part of the energy; for the Paraclete is not divided.'

You hear how in the holy Virgin the very hypostasis of the Son of God came to be, whence He was incarnate and became man, but in the apostles and all others, some energy or power, or part of the energy, or even having first sanctified the Virgin, whence necessarily no incarnation followed in them, but how does 'He who is everywhere present and fills all things' come to be in the Virgin? And how is this very thing everywhere present? Tell me first, and I will tell you the second. For that it is incomprehensible, the Golden-Tongued is a witness, saying in the first On the Incomprehensible: 'I will confess to You that You are fearfully wonderful; I thank You for this, that I have an incomprehensible Master,' not speaking here of essence, for that, as confessed, he passed over as incomprehensible, but concerning the omnipresence of God, he says this, showing that he does not know how He is everywhere present. And how, again, of the omnipresent one, do the participants partake not of the essence but of the energy? And how do they also lose it, tell me, if it were not energy that is participated? For to say that the divine essence is added and removed is beyond all absurdity. That they lose it, Saul is a witness, having not only lost the good energy but also taken on the opposite. And David is a witness, singing to God: 'Take not Your Holy Spirit from me.' These things the Damascene John theologizes, saying: 'God is mingled with all according to the sustaining power of the nature in each, but the Son and God is mingled with the assumption according to hypostasis.'

And the marvelous Gregory philosophizes in his discourse To Akindynos, from whom you, having cut off the saying, brought it forth not so much against him as against yourself. For he says: 'These things are sufficient to persuade that neither is the grace and energy of the Spirit given and received by the graced ones created, for it is the Holy Spirit itself, nor is it the essence of the Spirit, for God gives His own essence to no one, nor can it be received by anyone without proving the receiver to be of two natures, composed, that is, of divine and human nature, and this if it were united to it according to hypostasis, which is impossible, both pre-existing and each of the composed having its own hypostasis. Therefore, the Son of God, taking from us not a hypostasis but a nature, was united to it according to hypostasis. For the nature united according to itself will necessarily suffer mixture and will act and be acted upon. These things, then, and the united heteroousia have the union concerning them unconfusedly. The very divine nature itself, therefore, participated in and received, will either suffer mixture or, having consumed the passible nature, will arrive before it is received. This, indeed, and more: for no one, He says, will see My face and live, and no one has stood in the substance and essence of the Lord, as it is written, and no one has seen or declared the nature or form of God.' If no one can endure the vision, how participation? Therefore, the God-bearing fathers declared God according to essence to be entirely unparticipated and incomprehensible.

Do you see how this new theologian truly adheres to theological precision throughout and to the confession and harmony with the divine fathers? For he has not even placed this charge against us from himself, but having heard the God-bearing father Basil say: "Ezekiel saw the likeness of the glory and not the glory itself, and he fell to the ground from fear. If the likeness of the glory, when seen, caused fear and anguish in men, if someone were to behold God Himself, he would certainly perish, as it is said, 'No one shall see God and live.'"

And how is it not irrational to seek precision in hypothetical statements? For if you say that it is possible for the essence of God to be participated in or seen, say it clearly, and there will no longer be any argument between us, since you stand with the Messalians and oppose the saints. This is what the God-bearing confessor Maximus says: "He who is not present in beings according to essence but wishes to be participated in by those who are able, in another manner, does not depart at all from the secrecy according to essence." And the most divine Cyril, clearly declaring: "God is seen according to energies, not according to essence." But if up to this point you respect piety and avoid impiety, why do you scrutinize the absurdities that follow from what is said hypothetically? For not only this, but many other absurdities arise from this one hypothesis, such as that the divine essence is divided and is participated in more by some and less by others, that it is added and removed, that it is given and sent and poured out, and this to some at a time and for a reason, that it is imparted to those who have not yet partaken by those who have previously partaken, and moreover, that each of the participants would have to be composed of two essences, like the Savior Christ, if the participated were essence. To these let this also be added, which you yourself drive at, that it "consumes the passible nature before it is received." For not theologizing and dogmatizing, but as if adding an absurdity, and this showing the divine transcendence, out of piety, not from an absurd opinion, the blessed one said what he said. Just as, therefore, it is with that theological saying: "That the uncontainable might be contained, at least moderately, by created nature and as far as is safe."

However, what concerns the Theotokos must be set apart from all discussion, being the most supernatural wonder of all wonders from eternity and above all understanding. For in

her, truly, God wished to demonstrate His omnipotence, except that even she was purified beforehand by a more abundant grace of the Holy Spirit and divine power. "For the Virgin," says the great Athanasius, "was filled with power and the Spirit for the sanctification of her flesh and to be able to bear the saving child. For not only against wickedness, but also against created nature in general, God is said to be 'a consuming fire.'" And the inspired hymnographer from Damascus sings to the all-blameless Virgin: "The bush on the mountain, burning with fire and the dew-bearing furnace of the Chaldeans, clearly prefigures you, O bride of God; for you received the immaterial divine fire in a material womb without being consumed." And in the troparia for the Feast of Lights, as if from the Jordan: "I cannot bear," it says, "the consuming fire." And the divine Cosmas, as if from the Forerunner: "That I, the water, might wash you, the radiance of the glory of the Father, the eternal image, and being grass, might touch the fire of your divinity."

But if corruption is not the complete destruction of essence, but the change into another form, what is the absurdity if, according to this reasoning, someone were to say that the divine nature is corruptible? For the one who said this shows a certain superabundance of power, just as fire, by an excess of power, consumes a great amount of material in a short time, not changing it into non-being, but pouring it into air through evaporation. But if neither the blessed Virgin was corrupted, nor the Baptist when he touched, nor anyone else, but they were preserved by another power, the sustaining and guarding power, under which even Moses was sheltered, "the hand of God" being called metaphorically, he saw His back, the reasons of beings, the vision of His face, which is the essence, being entirely forbidden, even though he asked so much and was so intimate. For the powers in God do not act irrationally, like the burning power in fire, which is simple and irrational, but they are measured by His will for the economy of created nature. But even this reasoning has led us around. For how will you receive the varied disposition of God, as of members, in Scripture, if not according to the powers and energies naturally inherent in Him? For surely hands and feet, eyes and heart and mouth and lips and the rest of the members are not bodily present in God. "For I will behold," says the Golden-Mouthed, "the heavens, the works of Your fingers," not that God has fingers, but showing the visible works of the least energy.

What we were saying, that God is present to all, or rather, is in all, but not as mingled with all, nor as united and becoming one with them or being participated in by them—for this is given to the saints alone, purified to the utmost, and to them the manner is unknown, only this much is known, that the participation is not according to essence but according to some divine energy and grace. To say the same thing, according to what is naturally and eternally inherent in the eternal God: "For the kingdom of God," says Maximus, the truly great one, "is the communication of the good things naturally inherent in God by grace." And the same one again: "All that God is, the one who has been deified by grace will also be, except for the identity according to essence."

But let these things be said to this extent. Concerning the mysteries, who does not know that the grace of the Spirit, descending, according to the holy theologians, "even in the Virgin, prepared the God-bearing flesh," as the great Basil says, "transforms these into that deified body and blood. For this the priest also calls from above, and the Golden-Mouthed is a witness, saying in his discourse on the priesthood: 'The priest stands, not bringing down fire, but the Holy Spirit and the supplication he makes for a long time, not that some lamp from above might be let down to consume the offerings, but that the grace falling on the sacrifice might through it kindle the souls of all and show them brighter than silver, having been

purified.'" And a little later: "Do you not know that never would a human soul have borne that fire of the sacrifice, but all would have been utterly destroyed, if there had not been much help from the grace of God?" Therefore, not according to us and our opinion, but according to you and yours, not a few or small absurdities arise. For if the grace of the Spirit is not something other than His hypostasis, how is it that it descends, while the body is created and now transformed by the hypostasis of the Word? It follows either that it is not this but the hypostasis of the Spirit that was incarnate, which none of the impious heretics has dared to say, or some Sabellian confusion and dissolution of the Son and the Spirit occurring in the same, but not so with us, not so do the leaders of the Church teach. For Chrysostom, the theologian, interpreting the psalm, "Grace is poured upon your lips," says: "What is this grace, through which He taught, through which He worked wonders? He calls grace here that which came upon the flesh, 'upon whom you see the Spirit descending like a dove and remaining on Him, this is the Son of God.' For all grace was poured out into that temple, for He does not give the Spirit to Him by measure, but the temple received the whole grace. But we have received a little and a drop from that grace, for 'from His fullness,' it says, 'we have all received,' as one might say, from the overflowing, from the superabundance."

And the great Basil in his twelfth letter to Amphilochius: "Through the Holy Spirit to become a partaker of the grace of Christ, to be called a child of light, to partake of eternal glory." You hear above and below the teachers saying that the grace of the Spirit was that which was poured out into that temple and through it is imparted to us. For even if it is said that 'all the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him bodily,' yet not so as to make the paternal hypostasis or that of the Spirit occur in the same and consequently either be co-incarnate or mingled with one another according to the madness of Sabellius. "For the hypostasis of the Son," says the divine Anastasius of Sinai, "having been incarnate, did not co-incarnate with itself the unbegottenness of the Father, nor the processional hypostasis of the divine Spirit, but since all the natural properties of the Trinity, that is, the unbegotten, the uncreated, the uncircumscribed, the unchangeable, the undivided, the good, the life-giving, and all such things, are seen in the Son without variation and equally and similarly as in the Father and in the Holy Spirit, for this reason it is said, 'all the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him,' and according to this the Christ is said to be perfect in divinity." And a little later: "Therefore, by the natural properties, 'all the fullness of the Godhead,' as indeed also of the humanity, is seen in Christ."

This, therefore, is the common grace of the Trinity, which is naturally and eternally inherent in the one and eternal nature, which was then poured out into that temple and dwelt there; now it transforms the bread into the body hypostatically united to the God-Word and through it is again imparted and sanctifies the participants. And thus no absurdity follows from these things being thus believed, but every absurdity is removed and put away.

"They, therefore, attributing all to the energy, accordingly call it properly divinity and life and wisdom and the others without separation; and through it they believe that the divine essence also is and is called these things." And very consistently, I would say, not only with what has been previously demonstrated, but also with all the theologians and the truth itself; even if you do not understand these things as you should. For if the divine essence is entirely incomprehensible and unparticipated, unnamed and above every name, as the theologians hymn, how would it not be, if something is named from the energy inseparably united to it, which is also received and participated in and seen and named, yet by grace—for this reason it is also called grace—how would it not be named? But that these things are not ours, let the

theologians again come forward, confirming what has been said by themselves. For the divine Dionysius says in his work On Unified and Distinct Theology: "If we name the hyper-essential hiddenness God or life or essence or light or word, we understand nothing other than the powers proceeding from it to us, deifying or essence-making or life-giving or wisdom-giving; but to it, according to the release from all intellectual energies, we attribute."

And the same one again: "God is power, as precontaining and transcending all power in Himself." And Gregory of Nyssa in his Against Eunomius: "We have understood that the voice of God has prevailed from the visionary energy, so that even through this we are taught some partial energy of the divine nature, but we have not come to the conception of the essence itself through this voice." And the great Basil in his letter to Eustathius: "The identity of the energy in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit clearly shows the invariability of the nature, so that even if the name of divinity signifies nature, it is properly applied also to the Holy Spirit, the commonality of the essence is composed, but I do not know how they bring the appellation of divinity to the indication of the nature, those who construct everything."

And a little later: "Therefore, the appellation brings the indication of some authority, whether visionary or energetic; but the divine nature remains unsignified in all the names conceived, as our discourse." And the same one again: "Whether, therefore, the name of divinity is a name of energy, as one energy of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so we say that there is also one divinity; or even according to the opinions of many, the name of divinity is indicative of nature, because it finds no variation in the nature, not unfittingly do we define the holy Trinity as one divinity." And in the first book Against Eunomius: "What exceptional thing will they leave for the knowledge of the Only-Begotten or the Holy Spirit, if they themselves have the comprehension of the essence itself? For surely, attributing the contemplation of the power and goodness and wisdom of God to the Only-Begotten, they will set the comprehension of the essence proportionate to themselves; for everywhere the opposite, it is likely that the essence is unobservable by all, except by the Only-Begotten and the Holy Spirit, but from the energies of God leading us up and through the works understanding the maker, we receive the understanding of His goodness and wisdom; for this is 'the known of God, which God has manifested to all men.'"

And the divine Anastasius of Sinai in the book called The Guide: "The name God does not signify the essence of the divinity, for this is incomprehensible and unnamed, but He is called God from His contemplative energy, as the saint Dionysius says." What then, wretch, leaving the saints, do you accuse Palamas and the patriarchs? For they hardly depart in a single word from what has been theologized by them. For what is here taken as from the letter to Cyzicus is not found there at all, but the stranger to the Church, first calling us first and second patriarch, O shameless one! But not first and second, O patricide and heir of anathema, but each of these is many times removed and the genuine successor of those holy hierarchs, in the splendor of life and the accuracy of doctrines. For to those ancient ones, as in all things agreeing, the things said refer, but let us also set forth some of those who have recently shone in this throne with the power of word and spirit, that we may see if they are not all of one mind and of the same opinion and standing for the same things with them. For Germanus, the divine one, called new because of his homonymy with that ancient one, writing to the Latins, having first read the things foretold by the great Athanasius in his homily on the Annunciation, adds: "You see how, when the fathers say that the Holy Spirit descends and dwells in the saints, they do not say the hypostasis itself, but the grace."

And a little later, setting forth again the words of the divine Cyril: "Releasing the sins of the one attached to Him, He anoints him with His own Spirit; which He Himself, the Word from God the Father, pours out and causes to spring up from His own nature for us," he adds: "Here the grace and energy of the blessed Trinity, he says, proceeding from the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and as the prophet himself says, 'I will pour out of My Spirit,' that from the identity of the energy He might also present the identity of the essence." And Gregory, who adorned the same throne of the queen from Cyprus, stretching out against the Latin-minded Beccus, says this: "It is not possible, O this one, for the divine essence to be comprehensible to us; for if the six-winged Seraphim do not at all endure to bear the radiance and brightness sent forth from the divine nature, how is it reasonable that our material mortal nature should be receptive of the divine essence itself? Once this has been granted to us, in the ineffable and incomprehensible and supernatural union of the God-Word, our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, by the good pleasure of the Father and the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, and our Lord Jesus Christ bore two natures in Himself, divinity and humanity, but to us the better things are supplied, not the essence and hypostasis of the all-holy Spirit—for the divine essence is not comprehensible and divisible and varied; for it is simple and entirely unrelated and unparticipated—but the divine and good-making and single radiance and grace and energy of the all-holy Spirit, which simply and impartibly and identically and wholly and singly always springs from the hyper-divine one tri-hypostatic nature, and this varied and divided indivisibly in the divisible; for according to the measure of each one's virtue, the better ones draw it; and some more, others less receive it and are called gods from it by grace and participation. And this divine radiance and grace, energy and gift of the all-holy Spirit, the divine Scriptures also name the Holy Spirit, but also divinity and God and deifying; for in the simple and incorporeal nature, the same account applies to the essence and the energy, as the great Basil says in the Antirrhetics, since we also call the sun itself the solar disk, but also the radiance and energy sent from it."

What do you think these things differ from what has now been said by Palamas and the patriarchs? Are they not moved by the same Spirit, dogmatizing the same things about the same things? But let us consider what follows. They seem to have arrived at this religion from not believing that God Himself, by one power, is able to bring forth all things and govern and save by the same, through supreme perfection and simplicity and unity, but by this one thing and through another another, and from that that. For the one who completed for them the patriarch, as has been said, the third, in what he set forth in chapters, in the eighth of these, says: "The names said and written about God are names of His divine energies, that is, God has power and energy working in all living things, whether you speak of human life or divine life, and that energy is called the life of God; He has power and energy in the enlightened, the light, and that energy is called light; before these, similarly, He has power and energy working in the deified, the deification, and that energy is called divinity." Therefore, when they say that these are distinguished from one another, they name them in the plural divine energies and divinities, but when unitedly, just as we are accustomed to call the whole one world, they make the discourse about one energy, therefore they also seek in the fourth of their questions, if indeed the voice of divinity is hymned not only about the essence but also about the energy. From what he has said, that God has energy working in all living things, whether you speak of human life or divine life, it is clear that they glorify that the life of God and human life are energized by the same and one energy, and the wisdom of God and human wisdom are made wise by the same and one wisdom, and the others

similarly; for this is what they mean in the confession of the Tome, that both to energize and to be energized can be said not only of created things but also of eternal and uncreated things. From these, therefore, as if piling them up into one cosmos, they say that this is the inheritance of all the righteous.

I have deliberately elaborated on these matters at length so that the malice, incoherence, and absurdity of this contemptible individual may be clearly demonstrated. For just as one who composes riddles or speaks to a crowd of youths playing in the marketplace, so does he weave his arguments, focusing solely on this one aim and striving to ensnare his listeners with the clamor of his words, thereby surrounding us, as it were, with many apparent absurdities. Yet I believe that none of this escapes the notice of those who are not entirely distracted by other concerns. Two things, in particular, are worthy of attention: the extreme vanity evident in his words, by which he pretends to be ignorant of nothing said by his opponents, and at the same time, the corruption of his judgment concerning his own doctrine. For let anyone who possesses sound faith consider what compelled him, after proposing certain things at the outset, to chatter about such matters in the middle of his discourse. As for me, when engaging in dialogue with him, I would never have mentioned the writings of Gregory or Kydones or any others of their kind, for I would have abhorred even to glance at such things, much less to take them up and hastily cast them aside, had not the necessity of refutation compelled me to address them. I believe that every devout person would feel the same. But this wretched man, being evidently unstable in his own beliefs, seeks to find truth not among his opponents but elsewhere, and finding nothing, he plunders their words and uses them as material for slander, all the while seeking to gain a reputation for erudition. Thus, the miserable man endures, transforming himself like that Proteus of old, not merely misinterpreting but perverting everything into contrary and strange notions, playing in matters that are no game—or rather, being played with and becoming an object of ridicule himself, so that he might cast blame on others.

He imagines, then, that God wonderfully brings all things into being, governs, and saves them by a single power, and yet he strangely contradicts the patriarch, who speaks of "various powers and energies," as though, unless the patriarch were to say that God brings all things into being through Himself, he would be introducing a composite or imperfect God or one not in precise harmony with the saints. For perhaps this man, hearing of "powers," thinks of them as parts supplementing the divine essence or as other substances existing externally alongside God, like the angelic powers which God might employ as helpers. But, O most excellent one, it was not the patriarch who first spoke of powers, nor did he introduce them on his own authority. Rather, he took them from certain sources, as has already been said and will be said again. For Gregory the Theologian, the namesake of theology, says: "I considered the sun, its ray, and its light, but even here I fear lest we make the Father a substance and fail to hypostasize the others, but instead make them powers of God, existing within Him but not hypostasized."

Do you hear the voice of the Theologian calling them "powers of God," existing within Him but not hypostasized, to which the ray and the light are more appropriately said to belong? And what of the divine Dionysius when he says: "God is called Power as He contains and transcends all power”? And what when he says: "To conceive of God as life or substance or light or Word is to conceive of nothing other than the powers proceeding from God to us, which deify, substantiate, give life, or bestow wisdom"?

And the great Athanasius, in his Against the Hellenes, says: "The almighty and perfect Word of the Father, having come upon all things and everywhere extended His powers, holds and binds all things together in Himself."

Do these men, then, who speak of many powers in and from God, think of God as composite or imperfect or as not bringing all things into being through Himself? How, then, does God bring all things into being, govern, and save them by a single power? Is it because by His creative power He not only creates but also provides, and by His providential power He not only provides but also creates, and so by all powers He does all things, or by one of these powers He does all things, or by another power besides these? If by all powers He does all things, then there are many powers; but if by one of these, consider which one you will assign to all things. For by the creative power, you have heard that God rested from all His works and no longer acts according to it, unless He should will to work a miracle. But by the providential and sustaining power, you hear the Savior saying: "My Father is working until now, and I am working." Which of these, then, or of the others, will you choose, since they are so different? But if by another power besides these, it would be absurd for a non-creative power to create or a non-providential power to provide, yet it would still be a power distinct from the divine essence, even if it does not harm the unity. How, then, having heard of a human life and a divine life activated by the divine power, did he conclude that the divine life is that by which God lives?

"For it is clear," he says, "that both the life of God and human life are activated by the same and single energy."

Has this man become so confused in his mind, in matters where he presumes to theologize and expound doctrines, that he does not even understand what he is saying? For it is clear even to those with little understanding that the patriarch spoke of a divine life, not that by which God lives, but that by which men live divinely, which is not according to nature but supernaturally added to this temporal life. For whether you speak of human life, by which we live according to nature, or of divine life, by which those deemed worthy live beyond nature, both are activated by the one and the same life-giving power and energy of God, which distributes itself variously according to the disposition of those who receive it, so that some partake of it merely to exist, others to exist well, and still others to exist eternally well, having become gods by grace and divine ordinance.

"For the Holy Spirit," says the great Basil in his Against Eunomius, "is inaccessible by nature but made accessible by goodness, filling all things by His power but shared only by the worthy, not in one measure but according to the proportion of faith, dividing the energy. Simple in essence, varied in powers, wholly present to each and wholly everywhere, impartially distributed and wholly shared, like the image of the sun's ray, whose grace, present to the one who enjoys it as if to him alone, shines on the earth, the sea, and is mingled with the air."

And again in the same work: "That which was moved by an eternal movement by the Holy Spirit became a holy living being. Man was deemed worthy to receive the Holy Spirit within himself, becoming a prophet, an apostle, an angel of God, whereas before he was dust and ashes."

And again: "When the Spirit sends forth life into another hypostasis, it is not separated from Him, but just as fire has its inherent heat and also the heat it imparts to water or the like, so also the Spirit both has life in Himself and those who partake of Him live in a godly manner, possessing divine and heavenly life."

What clearer images or more precise proofs of the divine powers and energies could one seek than these? For just as the sun's heating power, proceeding through its ray, as the great Dionysius says, variously activates and shines as a single light upon those who partake of it, renewing, nourishing, guarding, perfecting, distinguishing, uniting, warming, making fruitful, increasing, transforming, establishing, producing, stirring, and giving life to all things, and each thing partakes of the same and one sun through its ray according to its own nature, so also the life-giving and life-creating power of God, indivisibly divided, gives life to all things according to their own nature. And just as it is said to act inseparably from God (for God also acts according to it), so also it is said to be activated in those who partake of it variously, just as the skill in the craftsman both acts in the craftsman concerning his works and is activated again in those works when it is received.

"For God always had the power to create," you have heard the Sixth Council say, "but this power was activated when God willed."

And so there is nothing absurd in saying that the same power both acts and is activated. This, then, is the pure doctrine of our faith, and not the babbling of this madman. He accuses us not only of speaking of the divine powers and energies in the plural but also of piling them up, as though we were calling them a kind of ordered arrangement and a single energy. For it seems he has turned his mind to the Platonic ideas and thinks that we posit the divine powers as something like them, not realizing, due to the madness that possesses him, that an ordered arrangement and a system can be spoken of concerning things that exist in themselves, not in another, and that too naturally and eternally. For the powers of God, existing in Him uniquely and timelessly in an ineffable unity, are brought forth in time and multiplied according to the image of the sun's ray, as the theologians say, into the manifold variety of creation. From themselves, they have both unity, insofar as they are called one energy, and distinction, insofar as they are many—the former in respect to the subject, since the energy is one with the essence, and the latter in respect to temporal division. For divisions, as the Apostle says, "are of gifts, but the same Spirit." And nothing of ours requires either distinction, as this madman thinks, or piling up. Let him also hear the divine Maximus theologizing about the procession of the energies, for he says in his Letter to John the Synkellos:

"We, according to the divine fathers, know that in the one and the same Christ there are many and innumerable divine and human energies, but one divine energy, from which the many divine energies proceed, and one human energy, from which the many human energies proceed. For we know one divine energy of His as God according to essence, which the Father also has by nature and the Holy Spirit, from which, as I said, the many and innumerable divine energies properly proceed. For from this one energy come the energies according to creation, providence, judgment, preservation, the generation and procession of beings, and all the divine and infinite energies."

And again: "Energies are not substances, nor do they exist by themselves, but they are in the essence and without it they have no being."

But lest I weary you by running through the intermediate points where he babbles his usual nonsense and openly reveals himself as a Massalian, thinking the essence of God to be participable, he finally fabricates a mode of difference out of slander, as a kind of device against us, and hurls it at us: "For they have dared this also," he says, "that the essence is immortal through itself, but the energy, though immortal through the essence, is death through itself."

And Palamas says in his On the Divine and Deifying Participation: "If they live immortally in this way and have died, and many of those living here are dead, as the Lord of life and death has shown, then there is also a divinity that is death, remaining immortal by nature."

Is it not clear to all from what has now been said that he shakes at us the sounds of words, inventing arguments like some bogeyman? For the slanderer has so corrupted and distorted the matter that it has no relation at all to the argument and harmony there. For so it is also seen to lie there, as both the books testify and the texture of the argument compels. There is, then, also a death of the soul, while it remains immortal by nature. Now, therefore, if you wish, remove from here the mode of difference, you wretch. Whom do you think you will frighten by babbling and fabricating such things? But perhaps you do not hope to frighten, but to deceive those who lend you their ears in great folly, and it is no wonder, since the serpent from the beginning hoped and accomplished this.

Thus, according to these and even more modes of difference and opposition, they divide the one God into essence and energy, and then, as though it were not the essence and the non-essential, the hypostatic and the non-hypostatic, the visible and the invisible, and the rest of the opposites that come together into one composition—for a composite is that which is composed of many and different things or that which is completed by many coming together into the same, according to the unerring teaching of the theologians—they insist that no composition arises from the essence of God and what they think to be really different things coexisting with it, contrary to all reason and all teaching of the holy teachers.

He walks in a path, or rather in trackless and wandering ways, turning aside to the greatest charge against them, that of composition, and for this reason he unfolds those long courses, searching out as many modes of difference as possible, so that by greatly separating the energy from the essence and then attempting to join them, he might find the composition appearing as an evil result by some wicked craftsman. From what he here insolently calls the divine energy, he gives no composition, for the non-essential and the non-hypostatic, what composition could it produce? But neither does the non-essential alongside the essence, O sophist, just as neither does the unjust alongside justice, nor the non-hypostatic or wholly non-hypostatic or unhypostatic, nor is there any opposition according to the visible and the invisible, as there is no need to agree, and so also in the rest. If we place the energy as visible in the Spirit according to the theologians and through it God, these things, though blasphemously and impiously, he has said against himself. But he slanders us as thinking that the natural properties of God, which are really different things, coexist with the essence, taking "things" to mean "really different." But it is not the same, O devil—for this name suits you best—to be things and to be really different. For we say and think according to the teachers, as has been shown before, that they naturally and essentially and uncreatedly inhere in the essence of God, but we deny that they are really different, as this belongs to things that exist in themselves and not to those distinguished only in thought. Thus, there will be no composition from these in the essence of God, and this according to all the theologians in succession, not only following the letter, Judaically, as you rave, but much more the meanings. For John of Damascus, the most theological, says: "The true word teaches that the divine is simple and has one simple good energy, activating all things in all according to the sun's ray."

And Basil the Great, in his To Amphilochius, as if from the Arians thus: "God is simple," he says, "and everything that you can enumerate as known is of the essence, to which the

great man, stretching out, says, "This is a sophism having countless absurdities. For with so many things enumerated, are these names of one essence? And does His fearfulness equal His love for mankind, His justice equal His creativity, His foreknowledge equal His retribution, His majesty equal His providence? Or if we say any of these, do we not signify the essence? For if they say this, let them not ask us if we know the essence of God, but let them ask us if we know God as fearful or just or loving mankind. These we confess to know. If, then, they say the essence is something else, let them not deceive us by simplicity. For they have confessed that the essence and each of the enumerated things are different, but the energies are various, and the essence is simple. We say that we know our God from His energies, but we do not promise to approach His essence. For His energies descend to us, but His essence remains inaccessible."

And in his Against Eunomius, the same says: "The modes that indicate the peculiarity of God do not harm the account of simplicity, or else all that is said about God will show Him to be composite to us, and as it seems, if we are to preserve the notion of the simple and partless, we will say nothing about God except the unbegotten, and we will refrain from calling Him invisible, incorruptible, unchangeable, creator, judge, and all that we now take up for glorification, or accepting these names, what shall we do? Shall we refer them all to the essence? Then we will show Him not only composite but also composed of unlike parts, since something different is signified by each name. But shall we take them outside the essence? Whatever account, then, they devise for each of these, let them show the same for the name of the unbegotten."

And his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, in his Against Eunomius, writes: "Who says that God is of two natures except you, who conflate every notion of a name with the essence of the Father and say that nothing is added from outside, but each of the names concerning the divine is grafted onto the essence of God?"

And Gregory the Theologian says: "Are immortality, innocence, and unchangeability the essence of God? If so, there are many essences of God and not one, or the divine is composite, for these are not uncompounded, if they are essences."

Do you see how the teachers not only distinguish the names concerning God from the essence (for, as they say, the essence is one thing, and each of the enumerated things is another), and thus uphold the simplicity of God, but also oppose those who place all these things in the essence, rebuking them for introducing composition? These are the Eunomians, Arians, and, according to you, the present-day Barlaamites. For he says that these things are not uncompounded if they are essences. What, then, will you do? To use their words, will you refer all these things to the essence? This, indeed, you do in many places, following the Eunomians, but in this way, you will prove God not only to be composite but also composed of unlike parts, since something different is signified by each name. For nothing prevents repetition, but will you take them outside the essence? This, then, you would rather choose, to abandon your tongue than to agree with the saints and our teachers. Therefore, being unable to speak ill of them, you turn your love of slander against these men and, having insolently set forth the saying of the patriarch, you add: "That these things testify to the great folly of the man, there is no need to say."

But I will present to you the saints, who speak almost the same words. Perhaps in this way, you will cease your madness against him.

"Suppose," says the great Gregory of Nyssa hypothetically, "someone discovered geometry, and let the same person be supposed to have also discovered astronomy, medicine,

grammar, agriculture, and other such pursuits. Since the notions of these pursuits are many and diverse, will the soul, therefore, be thought to be composite? Indeed, the meaning of medicine differs greatly from that of astronomy, and grammar has no common meaning with geometry, nor again does navigation with agriculture. Yet it is possible for the account of each of these to be gathered around the one soul, and the soul does not thereby become composite, nor are all the names of the pursuits mixed into one meaning. If, then, the human intellect, through so many names said of it, is not harmed in its simplicity, how could one suppose that God, if He is called wise, just, good, eternal, and all the other godly names, unless one meaning is thought to belong to all the names, would become composite or gather to Himself the perfection of His nature by participation?"

And the divine Maximus, the pinnacle of confessors and philosophers, in his Dialogue with Pyrrhus, says to him: "Do you not see that you err in this, in failing to understand everywhere that compositions belong to things that exist in themselves and not to things contemplated in another? And this is the common opinion of all, both the external philosophers and the theologians of the Church who initiate us into the mysteries."

To which of these, tell me, will you attribute the folly? For of the things said by the patriarch, one teacher said one thing, and another said another, which indeed the common opinion of all the teachers and the external wise men has testified to be. You have thus unwittingly revealed yourself as uninitiated in all these things, so that I need say no more, as you dismiss this as foolish.

But concerning these matters, we will discuss them more fully later, where he himself seems to say something. For now, I think the words of the theologians alone suffice for us, standing like trophies against this wicked heresy among others. As for what follows, it would be more fitting to erase it with tears than to refute it with words, so greatly does it exceed all bounds of impiety and slander. For imitating those ancient heretics, and being unable, due to ignorance, to distinguish between polemical and didactic arguments, nor, out of malice or wickedness, presenting the arguments as they are without innovation, he invokes the great Gregory and the fathers around him, whose words are unbearable to hear for those who examine them and contemptible in thought for those who consider their depth. For because they say that God is and is spoken of not only according to essence but also according to energy, in harmony with the saints, this herald of impiety proclaims many gods to the God-loving, and having mutilated and distorted some of their sayings, in which they speak of energy or divine light (for the struggle was also about these), he cries out against them as though they were saying that the energy or light is another God, existing separately and independently, just as if he were to accuse those who call the sun's ray "sun" of introducing two suns, or those who call the intellect "mind" of introducing another mind. But this is not so. For neither do they say there are two suns or two intellects, nor do these men say there are two or many gods, even if they mention the energy as God's. For to call the inherent things from those in whom they inhere is to unite, not to divide.

There is, then, one God, understood and spoken of according to essence, power, and energy by the theologians. For it would be paradoxical otherwise, if the things that present the unity of God were to divide Him into many. "For there is one essence," they say, "one power, one energy, one glory, one kingdom, one grace." How, then, can these things, which unite the hypostases (for they are common and natural to the three), be thought to divide and set them apart? But as for the sayings he has put forward, having cut them up and corrupted them, let us set forth the meaning of some of them, so that his malice may be shown even in

these. For he introduces Palamas, in the second book of his Against the Second Barlaam, which he entitles Catalogue of the Outrageous Absurdities, saying thus:

"Nevertheless, since the things that partake of God are many, and the supra-essential essence of God is altogether unparticipated, there must, therefore, be something between the unparticipated essence and the participants, through which these things partake of God." And a little later, "We must, therefore, seek another God, not only self-sufficient, self-acting, and contemplating Himself through Himself, but also good, and simply, we must seek God in such a way as to be participable."

Why, then, has he omitted here the intermediate things and the few things he says? So that he may introduce as Palamas's own opinion the statement, "We must seek another God," supposedly said concerning the energy, whereas Palamas, as following the Barlaamite opinions, has set forth this absurdity, not as his own. And this is clear from what he has omitted. For he says, as objecting to that wretched Barlaam:

"O the loss! You have separated us from God, removing the bond from the midst and placing 'a great chasm' and an impassable gulf between Him and the creation and governance of created things. 'We must, therefore, seek another God,' and so on." Do you hear how the great man says this to that wretched Barlaam, as though, unless you grant that the same God who is unparticipated in essence is also participable in energies, 'we must seek another God,' to whom the participable also belongs? Such are your clever inventions against us and against the truth, and with such hunting of words did you hope to capture the Church. But as for what he says about light and divine grace and deification, as taken from the words of Palamas, it is superfluous to set them forth here. For when read by themselves by those who understand, they will clearly show his soul-destroying and demonic mindset, and how he utterly disbelieves in all divine participation and manifestation, and entirely separates God from created nature. For the wretch interprets divine things mockingly and impiously attacks the sacred, and the pig tramples the pearls, except that he does not break them against those who spoke them, but breaks himself against them. For his hatred, madness, and envy, by which he is consumed, are evident, especially in what follows, as destructive passions of those who possess them, not only of others. What, then, should one recount in detail all the things the shameless man blames on the innocent, some of which have already been said and refuted? For he does not hesitate to repeat the same things often, so that he may only harm the man's opinion. Others are inherently rotten and ridiculous and need no refutation at all. For having made this his work, to behave indecently in words and, as they say, to dance about, he presents himself as such. Let these things, then, be passed over, and let us proceed to the second part of his discourse, in which he more vigorously defends his own position, using arguments not weak, as he thinks, and adducing not a few things from Scripture.

APPENDIX









According to L. Petit, PO. 17, p. 372, littera π, id est πᾶς significatus propositio universalis affirmativa; littera οὐδ, scilicet οὐδείς, notari solet propositio universalis negativa.